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ABSTRACT 
Causation is commonly defined using the counterfactual model, and the 
“but-for” standard in particular. It asks whether the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff would have occurred in the absence of the defendant’s act. It is 
commonly believed, however, that the counterfactual model fails in cases 
involving multiple sufficient causes—that is, cases in which two or more 
forces contribute to an outcome where each force alone would suffice to 
produce the same outcome. This paradox has, over time, pushed causation 
standards into a state of ambiguity and disarray as courts have attempted to 
retain the counterfactual model as the appropriate framework for causation 
while abandoning it in multiple-sufficient-cause situations to attain the 
sought-after outcome. 
In this article, I argue that, contrary to common understanding, the 
counterfactual model does not fail in multiple-sufficient-cause situations. In 
particular, I propose the adoption of a framework for cause and effect in 
statistics and the sciences called the “potential outcomes framework,” and I 
apply it to explain and address the apparent paradox of multiple sufficient 
causes. I then extend my analysis to show a broad range of implications for 
fields such as torts, criminal law, contracts, constitutional law, and 
employment discrimination. Beyond demonstrating important consequences 
for standards of causation in various substantive areas of the law, I show 
how my analysis affects our understanding and treatment of timely issues, 
such as the judicial interpretation of causal language in criminal statutes and 
the permissibility of “mixed-motive” cases under Title VII and other federal 
discrimination laws.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Factual causation is the element of a legal claim that requires a plaintiff to 
link the defendant’s conduct to the plaintiff’s injury—to show that the former 
did not merely coincide with the latter but rather produced it. It is intended to 
reflect “natural” or “actual” cause and effect, a “scientific” causal connection 
between conduct and injury.1 It aims to capture “our common understanding 
of causation” and “deep-seated intuitions about causation and fairness in 
attributing responsibility.”2 Developing an appropriate standard, or even 
definition, of causation is a perennial problem across many areas of the law. 
Strangely, however, although courts frequently look to statistics and the 
sciences for evidence of causation—sometimes even requiring such evidence 
to prove causation—the law has rarely looked to these fields for guidance in 
developing a suitable definition of causation. This is in spite of a well-studied 
and robust field of science devoted to questions of cause and effect.3 
In this article, I propose the adoption of a pervasive framework for 
conceptualizing and answering questions of cause and effect in statistics and 
the sciences to inform the meaning of causation in law. It is called the 
potential outcomes framework, or the “Rubin Causal Model.” In particular, I 
aim to establish the applicability of the framework and to apply it to address 
a broad class of complex and longstanding problems. 
Courts and scholars frequently misunderstand the notion of actual or 
scientific cause and effect. In many cases this is without consequence, and a 
simple understanding suffices. But, in one common circumstance, this 
misunderstanding has wreaked havoc across a wide range of legal fields: 
situations involving “multiple sufficient causes.” In these cases, in which two 
 
1. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 314 (2d ed. 2016) (“These causal issues 
raise questions of fact in the scientific sense.”); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264–65 (5th ed. 1984) (“This question of ‘fact’ ordinarily is one 
upon which all the learning, literature and lore of the law are largely lost. It is a matter upon which 
lay opinion is quite as competent as that of the most experienced court.”); Richard W. Wright, 
The NESS Account of Natural Causation: A Response to Criticisms, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
CAUSATION 285, 285 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011) ( “natural (scientific, ‘actual’, ‘factual’) 
causation”); see also infra note 79 and accompanying text. Distinguish “scientific,” and even 
“statistical,” cause and effect from “probabilistic” notions of cause and effect. By “scientific” or 
“statistical” cause and effect, I refer simply to the way in which scientists or statisticians 
conceptualize cause and effect, whether “actual” or probabilistic, “ex post” or “ex ante.” See infra 
section III.A. 
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). Distinguish factual causation from proximate causation (or “scope of 
liability”), which restricts the field of liability to certain harms. Id. § 29. 
3. Throughout this article, I refer to the generic causal concept as “cause and effect,” the 
legal causal concept as “causation,” and the statistical or scientific causal concept as “causality” 
or “causal inference.” 
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or more forces contribute to produce an outcome (such as a plaintiff’s injury), 
where each force alone would suffice to produce the same outcome, a more 
nuanced understanding of cause and effect is needed. Indeed, 
multiple-sufficient-cause situations arise frequently and, as I will show, have 
important implications for a wide range of legal fields, including torts, 
criminal law, employment discrimination, constitutional law, and contracts, 
among others. The potential outcomes framework is applicable to these 
situations and instructive for solving the important and enduring problems to 
which they give rise. 
The most well-accepted and pervasive test of factual causation in the law 
is the “but-for,” or sine qua non, test. It uses a counterfactual model of 
causation: it asks whether an outcome would have occurred absent the alleged 
conduct. The but-for inquiry seeks to determine whether the defendant’s act 
was a necessary condition of the outcome. This standard is generally simple 
to apply and, in most cases, leads to clear and uncontroversial results. For 
example, in a case involving a driver who negligently ran a red light and 
struck a pedestrian, it is straightforward to infer that the driver’s negligent act 
is the but-for cause of the pedestrian’s injuries. 
In cases involving multiple sufficient causes, however, the but-for test is 
said to fail.4 It is often said, and courts have generally held, that in these 
situations “some other test is needed.”5 There are two categories of cases 
involving multiple sufficient causes (also referred to as “overdetermined 
causation” cases6): concurrent multiple sufficient causes and successive 
multiple sufficient causes.7 The “concurrent” category involves cases in 
which two or more forces occur concurrently to produce an injury—for 
example, two separate fires merge to destroy a plaintiff’s lodge, where each 
fire would have been sufficient to destroy it. Under the traditional but-for 
standard, the originator of each fire could assert that she is not liable for the 
damage because, even in the absence of her fire, the other fire would have 
destroyed the plaintiff’s lodge. The “successive” category involves cases in 
which two or more forces occur successively, with an earlier force 
“preempting” the effect of a second force. This would occur, for example, if 
 
4. Major v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 581 (Ct. App. 2017) (stating 
that “[t]he law is . . . clear” that the but-for test leads to the incorrect result in cases involving 
multiple sufficient causes); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 266 (“[T]here is one type of 
situation in which [the but-for test] fails. If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either 
one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other 
test is needed.”). 
5. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 266. 
6. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (1985). 
7. These are sometimes referred to as “duplicative” and “preemptive” causation scenarios. 
See id. at 1775. 
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one of the above fires alone destroyed the plaintiff’s lodge before the second 
fire arrived, but where the second fire would have been sufficient to destroy 
the lodge had the first fire not already destroyed it.8 Under the traditional 
but-for standard, the originator of the first fire could, as above, claim that she 
is not liable for the damage because, even in the absence of her fire, the 
second fire would have destroyed the lodge. 
Courts and scholars have arrived at a near-universal consensus that but-for 
causation is incapable of appropriately handling cases involving multiple 
sufficient causes. As a leading torts treatise states, “[t]he but-for test in such 
cases leads to a result that is almost always condemned as violating both an 
intuitive sense of causation and good legal policy.”9 Specifically, it is said 
that, in either duplicative or preemptive causation situations, “contrary to the 
laws of nature, common sense, and the decisions of the courts, neither fire [in 
the two-fire problem] would be treated as a cause under the strong necessity 
criterion [the principle feature of but-for causation], since neither was 
strongly necessary given the existence of the other.”10 
Courts, therefore, have commonly rejected the but-for standard in cases 
involving multiple sufficient causes, holding that it “should not be used when 
two ‘causes concur to bring about an event and either one of them operating 
alone could have been sufficient to cause the result.’”11 Instead, courts 
generally apply a vague “substantial-factor” test that relies on the intuition of 
the factfinder to make a causal determination. Moreover, the purported failure 
of the but-for test has prompted calls to abandon the counterfactual model 
altogether as a theory of factual causation.12 It has been argued, for example, 
that “[u]nless appearances are deceiving, [these] cases by themselves show 
that the counterfactual theory cannot be a theory of causation.”13 
It is frequently thought that multiple-sufficient-cause situations arise 
primarily in torts cases. But these situations, and the purported failure of the 
but-for test, arise frequently in a wide range of legal contexts. For example, 
they arise in contracts cases when multiple contractors fail to timely perform 
under a contract, where each breach alone would suffice to cause the 
 
8. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 321–22; KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 266–
67; Wright, supra note 6, at 1775–76. 
9. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 321–22. 
10. Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, Legal and 
Economic, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 474 (2016). 
11. Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876 (Cal. 1991) (quoting Vecchione v. Carlin, 168 
Cal. Rptr. 571, 576 (Ct. App. 1980)). 
12. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.  
13. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, 
AND METAPHYSICS 411 (2009); see also Note, Rethinking Actual Causation in Tort Law, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2165 (2017). 
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plaintiff’s damages. Perhaps most significantly—in light of the current state 
of confusion and controversy in this area of the law—“mixed-motive” 
employment discrimination cases can and should be understood as a special 
type of multiple-sufficient-cause situation. These cases involve an adverse 
employment action (e.g., firing an employee) that is motivated by both 
legitimate purposes (e.g., tardiness or rudeness to customers) and illegitimate 
purposes (e.g., race, gender, or age), where each purpose alone would suffice 
to produce the adverse action. Congress, the Supreme Court, and lower courts 
have grappled extensively to establish appropriate standards of causation in 
these circumstances, with unfortunate results—results that have led to vague 
and contradictory standards under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, and other discrimination statutes. 
In this article, I demonstrate the applicability of the potential outcomes 
framework for considering factual-causation problems in the law. I then 
apply it to explain the purported failure of the but-for model of causation in 
multiple-sufficient-cause situations. In particular, I show that but-for 
causation is only a specific measure of interest (in statistics terminology, a 
specific “estimand”) within the broader counterfactual model applicable to 
factual-causation inquiries. It is incorrect to conclude that counterfactual 
causation fails in multiple-sufficient-cause situations; and, it is 
oversimplified to conclude that the but-for standard in particular fails in these 
situations. I apply the potential outcomes framework—a predominant 
framework in the sciences and a counterfactual model of cause and effect—
to establish a more nuanced understanding of causation in law. Then, I argue 
that a refined conception of causation based on the potential outcomes 
framework carries a wide range of implications for causation problems across 
various areas of the law. In particular, I argue the following: 
1. My findings discredit efforts to abandon the counterfactual model of 
causation on the basis of its purported failure in multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations. 
2. Courts should reject the vague and intuition-based substantial-factor test 
of causation—a test that is prevalent in many areas of the law, 
notwithstanding its inadequacies—and, in cases involving multiple sufficient 
causes, should apply a counterfactual model that follows the potential 
outcomes framework. In practice, this approach can be simplified and applied 
by using the causal-set theory of the “NESS test” (defined below) and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, and, therefore, can be understood as providing 
a scientific foundation for these approaches. 
3. The potential outcomes framework informs judicial interpretation of the 
“ordinary meaning” of causal statutory language such as “because of,” 
“results from,” or “based on,” which courts frequently apply when a statute 
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does not specify a term’s meaning. My analysis could apply to resolve 
apparent conflicts between the ordinary meaning of a statute’s causal 
language and Congress’s intent to capture factors in multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations as “causes.” 
4. Finally, my analysis implies that, in mixed-motive employment 
discrimination cases, a motivating factor could be understood as a cause of 
an adverse employment action even when other sufficient motivating factors 
exist; and, as such, it could address contradictory, vague, and potentially 
inappropriate standards governing causation in these cases. 
I begin in Part II by introducing the problem of multiple sufficient causes. 
I describe why multiple-sufficient-cause situations and the application of the 
but-for standard in these situations are viewed as problematic, and how courts 
and scholars have addressed the issue. In Part III, I introduce the potential 
outcomes framework and its implications for factual causation. In Part IV, I 
apply a counterfactual model of causation that follows the potential outcomes 
framework to analyze concurrent and successive multiple-sufficient-cause 
problems. I show that, although an unrefined application of the counterfactual 
model fails in multiple-sufficient-cause situations, a more nuanced 
understanding of this model yields results that are consistent with common 
sense, policy, and court decisions. Because the problem of multiple sufficient 
causes has been litigated and discussed extensively in the torts context, and 
because other fields of law frequently refer to tort law when addressing the 
issue, I couch my argument in Parts II–IV in the torts setting. Then, in Part 
V, I discuss implications for a wide range of legal contexts, including torts, 
criminal law, contracts, and employment discrimination. In Part VI, I 
conclude. 
II. THE BUT-FOR STANDARD IN MULTIPLE-SUFFICIENT-CAUSE 
SITUATIONS 
Factual causation is widely understood as fundamental to legal liability, 
and to tort liability in particular.14 It is intended to reflect cause and effect in 
 
14. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 317; MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND 
ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 337–95 (10th ed. 2016); David W. Robertson, Causation 
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 
1008 (2009) (“[T]he cause-in-fact requirement is the ‘linchpin’ of the corrective-justice theory 
[of tort law]. Indeed, it has long been regarded as a truism that ‘a defendant should never be held 
liable to a plaintiff for a loss where it appears that his wrong did not contribute to it, and no policy 
or moral consideration can be strong enough to warrant the imposition of liability in such [a] 
case.’”) (quoting Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 947 
(1935)); John D. Rue, Note, Returning to the Roots of the Bramble Bush: The “But for” Test 
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the common, or “scientific,” sense, which, in turn, usually refers to 
counterfactual, or (in particular) but-for, cause and effect.15 As the Supreme 
Court has stated: 
A thing “results” when it “[a]rise[s] as an effect, issue, or outcome 
from some action, process or design.” “Results from” imposes, in 
other words, a requirement of actual causality. “In the usual 
course,” this requires proof “‘that the harm would not have 
occurred’ in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s 
conduct.”16 
The but-for condition is central to the concept of causation.17 However, 
applying the but-for standard to cases involving multiple sufficient causes 
gives rise to a paradox: despite the seemingly sound and well-accepted 
reasoning of the counterfactual model, and the but-for standard in particular, 
applying this reasoning leads to a seemingly illogical conclusion.  
Consider the following situation: 
Rosaria and Vincenzo were independently camping in a heavily 
forested campground. Each one had a campfire, and each 
negligently failed to ensure that the fire was extinguished upon 
retiring for the night. Due to unusually dry forest conditions and a 
stiff wind, both campfires escaped their sites and began a forest fire. 
The two fires, burning out of control, joined together and engulfed 
Centurion Company’s hunting lodge, destroying it. Either fire alone 
would have destroyed the lodge.18 
 
Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Institute’s Proposed Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2679–80 (2003) (“An empirically 
ascertainable connection between a defendant's tortious act and a plaintiff's injury (‘factual 
cause’) has long been considered a threshold question of liability.”) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971)). Note that law and economics scholars have often not viewed ex post 
cause and effect as necessary to promote the efficiency aims of tort law (and have sometimes 
viewed it as detrimental to such aims); but they at least recognize the importance of some causal 
link between misconduct and harm. See infra note 48. 
15. See supra note 1; infra note 79. 
16. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–11, 213–14 (2014) (citations omitted) 
(citing civil and criminal cases); see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 452 (2014) 
(“These alternative causal tests [to but-for causation] are a kind of legal fiction or construct.”). 
17. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 337 (“The core of causation is that if X had not 
occurred, Y would not have occurred. This requirement is frequently referred to as ‘but for’ or 
sine qua non.”). 
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. 
a, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). See generally DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 321 (citing Landers 
v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W. 2d 731 (Tex. 1952), a case in which two defendants 
were alleged to have independently caused salt water and oil to spill into plaintiff’s lake, killing 
plaintiff’s fish); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 89 (1956) 
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Our common intuition leads us to identify an event as a cause of an 
outcome if the outcome would occur in the presence of, but not in the absence 
of, the event—that is, if the outcome would not occur but for the event. This 
description characterizes the but-for conception of causation. Applying this 
standard to the example above, however, each camper could avoid 
responsibility, because the other camper’s fire would have alone caused the 
same result—the destruction of Centurion Company’s hunting lodge. It is 
practically a consensus that the but-for standard leads us astray in this type of 
situation, that it fails relative to our common sense of cause and effect in cases 
involving multiple sufficient causes.19 “Our senses have told us that [the 
defendant] did participate. . . . In the language of the layman, the defendant’s 
fire ‘had something to do with’ the burning of plaintiff’s property.”20 It has 
been said, therefore, that “the but-for test denies the existence of cause in fact 
while everything in human experience and intuition cries out that cause in 
fact was present.”21 These results are said to be “contrary to the laws of nature, 
common sense, and the decisions of the courts.”22 
This quandary has generally led courts to hold simply that “the ‘but for’ 
test . . . should not be used when two ‘causes concur to bring about an event 
and either one of them operating alone could have been sufficient to cause 
the result.’”23 Some courts and scholars have gone even further, arguing that 
 
(“Two noisy motorcycles simultaneously pass the horse on which plaintiff is riding, frightening 
the animal and causing it to run away and injure [the] plaintiff. . . . Similarly, a fire started through 
the negligence of a railroad may merge with a fire of undetermined origin and the two together 
destroy plaintiff's property.”) (citing Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902); Anderson v. 
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920)). 
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[W]hile the but-for standard provided in § 26 is a helpful method 
for identifying causes, it is not the exclusive means for determining a factual cause. Multiple 
sufficient causes are also factual causes because we recognize them as such in our common 
understanding of causation, even if the but-for standard does not. Thus, the standard for causation 
in this Section comports with deep-seated intuitions about causation and fairness in attributing 
responsibility.”). 
20. Malone, supra note 18, at 89 (commenting on the situation in which a railroad 
negligently started a fire, which then merged with another fire and destroyed plaintiff’s property). 
21. David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1777 
(1997). 
22. Wright & Puppe, supra note 10, at 474; see also Major v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 582 (Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting the but-for test, explaining that absent an 
alternative to the but-for test, “each of three equally liable [cigarette producer] tortfeasors can 
escape liability on the basis that they are neither but-for causes nor concurrent independent 
causes—a wholly unjust result”). 
23. Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876 (Cal. 1991) (quoting Vecchione v. Carlin, 168 
Cal. Rptr. 571, 576 (Ct. App. 1980)). 
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the failure of the but-for standard as applied to multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations invalidates it altogether as a model of causation.24 
Thus, at least in cases involving multiple sufficient causes, courts have 
replaced the but-for test with alternative standards, and predominantly the 
substantial-factor test.25 The substantial-factor test “was suggested as the 
proper test for cause-in-fact as early as 1911”26 and is used in the first and 
second Restatements.27 “Its primary function was to permit the factfinder to 
decide that factual cause existed when there were multiple sufficient causes—
each of two separate causal chains sufficient to bring about the plaintiff’s 
harm, thereby rendering neither a but-for cause.”28 But, as indicated in the 
Restatement Third, the substantial-factor test “has proved confusing and been 
 
24. See MOORE, supra note 13, at 411; Ben Gifford, State v. Brelo and the Problem of Actual 
Causation, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 186 (2017) (“As this essay illustrates, cases of concurrent 
sufficient causation challenge the standard picture of actual causation as but-for causation. This 
challenge must be resolved either by defending the standard picture—and thereby denying causal 
status to concurrent sufficient causes—or by modifying or replacing the standard picture. As this 
essay argues, the standard picture is likely due for a replacement.”); Florence G’sell, Causation, 
Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 503, 
512 (2016) (“The test produces counterintuitive results, especially in cases of causal 
overdetermination. . . . These problems have led some commentators to suggest the abandonment 
of the but for test.”); Note, Rethinking Actual Causation in Tort Law, supra note 13, at 2165; see 
also Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997) (stating that “California 
has definitively adopted the substantial factor test of the Restatement Second of Torts,” which 
“subsumes the ‘but for’ test while reaching beyond it to satisfactorily address other situations, 
such as those involving independent or concurrent causes in fact”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to 
another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm . . . .”). See generally 
Wright, supra note 6; Wright & Puppe, supra note 10. 
25. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 215–16 (2014) (“One prominent authority 
on tort law asserts that ‘a broader rule . . . has found general acceptance: The defendant's conduct 
is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.’”) 
(quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 267); see also Rue, supra note 14, at 2681 (“[T]he 
use of the ‘substantial factor’ test has mushroomed, and functions as a part of the causation 
analysis conducted by courts in ‘virtually every jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Ralph Nader, The 
Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims’ Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 15, 16 n.8 (1986)); Wright 
& Puppe, supra note 10, at 480 n.80 (citing cases that have used distinct but similar language, 
such as “material contribution”). 
26. BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 4:6 (2d ed. 
2018); see Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103 (1911). 
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431–32 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 431–32 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 268 (“The 
substantial-factor rule was developed primarily for cases in which application of the but-for rule 
would allow each defendant to escape responsibility because the conduct of one or more others 
would have been sufficient to produce the same result.”). 
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misused.”29 Therefore, the Restatement Third rejects the substantial-factor 
test in favor of the following formulation: “If multiple acts occur, each of 
which under § 26 [Factual Cause] alone would have been a factual cause of 
the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act 
is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”30 The Restatement Third adopts a 
form of the “causal-set” approach of the NESS (necessary element of a 
sufficient set) test,31 under which “a condition contributed to some 
consequence if and only if it was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of 
existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the 
 
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  
30. Id. § 27. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 268 (“It is possible—and 
more helpful it would seem—to apply an alternative formulation that addresses directly the need 
for declining to follow the but-for rule in this context. The alternative formulation is this: When 
the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their combined conduct, viewed 
as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and application of the but-for rule to them individually 
would absolve all of them, the conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event.”). 
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. c, § 27 cmts. a, f, i (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 
94 KY. L.J. 277, 277 (2005); Richard W. Wright, The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation 
and Liability, 7 J. TORT L. 65, 70 (2014).  
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consequence.”32 The NESS test has gained momentum,33 but courts 
predominantly follow the substantial-factor test endorsed by earlier 
Restatements.34 
The substantial-factor test has been widely criticized. For example, Joseph 
Sanders and Michael Green have written,  
The ambiguity surrounding the substantial-factor test leads to 
inconsistent results, at least across jurisdictions. More importantly, 
the test gives no clear guidance to the factfinder about how one 
should approach the causal problem. It also permits courts to engage 
in fuzzy-headed thinking about what sort of causal requirement 
should be imposed on plaintiffs, especially in cases that present 
complications in the availability of causal evidence.35  
Richard Wright and Ingeborg Puppe have stated that phrases such as 
“substantial factor” “are of no help in resolving the causation issue but rather 
 
32. Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1425, 1441 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Grounds and Extent]; Richard W. Wright, Once 
More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1132 (2001) [hereinafter Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush]; 
see Wright, supra note 6, at 1788–1803. 
The NESS test and the Restatement Third approach are based on the idea of causal sets. The 
NESS test, developed by Hart and Honoré and “refined and popularized” by Richard Wright, 
stems from scholarship in philosophy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010). In Hart and Honoré’s Causation in the 
Law, the authors discuss the idea of a “causally relevant factor,” which is a condition “necessary 
just in the sense that it is one of a set of conditions jointly sufficient for the production of the 
consequence: it is necessary because it is required to complete this set.” H.L.A. HART & TONY 
HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 112–13 (2d ed. 1985). This concept “relied on [John Stuart] 
Mill’s idea that a fully described causal law lists all the conditions that together are necessary and 
sufficient for the occurrence of a certain consequence.” G’sell, supra note 24, at 516–17. In 1965, 
John Mackie “employed an acronym, INUS (for ‘insufficient but non-redundant [necessary] part 
of an unnecessary but sufficient condition’), to refer to the conditions that make up the minimally 
sufficient set of abstract conditions that constitute a causal law.” Wright & Puppe, supra note 10, 
at 469. “If applied as a criterion for being an actual causal condition in a concrete singular 
instance, the INUS criterion would be one way of describing the least stringent, weak sense of 
necessity, which merely requires that a condition be necessary for the sufficiency of a set of actual 
conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the effect, rather than being always necessary 
(strict necessity) or necessary for the effect in the singular instance (strong necessity).” Id. at 469–
70. Wright ultimately sharpened Hart and Honoré’s account in the NESS test, which “confirms 
causal contribution by each fire” in the two-fire problem. Wright, supra note 6, at 1790–91. “Each 
fire was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of actual antecedent conditions that did not include 
the other fire.” Id. See generally SANDY STEEL, PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 15–47 (2015). 
33. See Fischer, supra note 31, at 277. 
34. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 322 (citing cases). 
35. Joseph Sanders, Michael D. Green & William C. Powers, The Insubstantiality of the 
“Substantial Factor” Test for Causation, 73 MO. L. REV. 399, 430 (2008) (the authors note that 
“[b]ecause of other obligations, [William] Powers is only able to join as a co-author of Part I of 
[the] Article” (id. at 399)). 
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are merely labels applied to an unexplained conclusion.”36 According to the 
authors, “[t]he words ‘factor,’ ‘contribution,’ and ‘causation’ merely restate 
the causal issue. The ‘substantial,’ ‘material’ and ‘common sense’ qualifiers 
only make things worse by adding tests of significance that confuse the 
causation issue with the normative responsibility issue.”37 In summary, the 
substantial-factor test is ill-defined, and it arguably leaves the causation 
inquiry to the intuition of the factfinder. 
Nevertheless, the substantial factor test is often viewed as “justified” as 
applied to cases involving multiple sufficient causes.38 Meanwhile, the 
courts’ use of alternative standards has not slowed attempts to explain or 
“modify” the but-for standard “to rescue [it] from its inadequacies.”39 One 
common “modification” involves  
add[ing] details to the description of the injury, including not only 
the time and/or location at which it occurred but also tautological 
references to the causal process by which it occurred. For example, 
in the two-fires situation, the injury is described as the destruction 
of the house (i) at this particular time, (ii) with this particular debris 
pattern, and/or (iii) by two fires.40 
These explanations have, however, been viewed as unsatisfying.41 
A second category of explanations involves affording causal status based 
on an aggregation of multiple events.42 But these explanations have also 
proved unsatisfying. According to Wright and Puppe: 
 
36. Wright & Puppe, supra note 10, at 480–81.  
37. Id. In an innovative article, J. Shahar Dillbary argued that, under certain circumstances, 
“group causation theories,” including the “concerted action, substantial factor, and alternative 
liability” theories, “reduce the parties’ incentives to take care and may result in more, not fewer, 
injuries.” J. Shahar Dillbary, Causation Actually, 51 GA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2016). Dillbary used this 
reasoning to “challenge[] the consensus that group causation theories abandon the actual 
causation requirement.” Id. at 6. In particular, he relied on a “multi-party dynamic” where, under 
certain circumstances, a party would not have incentive to engage in tortious behavior alone but 
would have such incentive if joined with the tortious behavior of another, given group causation 
theories that render the behavior liable. See id. at 5–7. 
38. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 322–23; see Malone, supra note 18, at 88–91; Robertson, 
supra note 21, at 1776–77. 
39. Wright, supra note 6, at 1781. 
40. Wright & Puppe, supra note 10, at 475. 
41. In addition to philosophical criticisms, they have been rejected on the ground that “[i]n 
law, the required causal relation is between the wrongful aspect of the defendant’s conduct and 
the properly described legal injury, which usually does not include its specific timing or location. 
Instead those details serve merely to identify the specific event or state of affairs for which 
causation of the legally relevant properties (the required legal injury) is at issue.” Id. at 476. 
42. Id. at 477; see KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 268; see also Wright, supra note 6, 
at 1780–81. 
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Some . . . treat the aggregate condition as a cause while illogically 
denying causation by any of the individual included conditions. 
Others illogically treat causation by the aggregate condition as 
establishing causation by each included condition. In Germany this 
is known as the “formula of alternatives” (Alternativenformel): “Of 
several conditions which can be eliminated separately but not 
cumulatively without the effect failing to occur, each is a cause.” 
Although advertised as an extension of the strong necessity 
criterion, this formulation instead directly contradicts it. The 
formula does not merely allow that the alternative cause is not a 
necessary condition, it prohibits it from being a necessary condition, 
to avoid being able to declare every fact as a cause for any event by 
combining it with a fact that is really a cause of it.43 
Furthermore, scholars have objected to combining a general application of 
the but-for standard with alternative standards to be applied in multiple-
sufficient-cause situations. Such “combination” approaches allow “policy 
considerations” to permeate what is intended to be a factual inquiry. In 1956, 
Wex Malone wrote: “For nearly a century judges and writers have struggled 
to unravel the tangled skein of fact and policy. Even today the search is on 
for a judging and language technique that will enable courts to deal with these 
two components separately and effectively.”44 Accordingly, “legal science 
began to recognize two separate notions—cause-in-fact, and ‘proximate’ or 
‘legal’ cause.”45 This division is perhaps highlighted most sharply today in 
 
 43. Wright & Puppe, supra note 10, at 477–78 (internal citations omitted). See generally 
STEEL, supra note 32, at 15–47 (“German law also clearly accepts causation in independent 
sufficiency cases. . . . The BGH recently described [duplicative-causation cases] as follows: ‘If 
an injury has been caused by several, simultaneously or concurrently effective, events, each of 
which would have been sufficient on its own to produce the entire injury, then, according to the 
case law of this court, each event is to be classed as a cause of the injury, as a matter of law, even 
though none satisfies the conditio sine qua non test.’” Id. at 23 (quoting BGH NJW 2013, 2018).). 
44. Malone, supra note 18, at 60. 
45. Id. See generally HART AND HONORÉ, supra note 32, at 90 (“[W]hether or not the harm 
would have happened without the act . . . ‘cause in fact’ . . . is the sole point of contact with what 
causation means apart from the law. All the remaining components are questions of the law’s 
policy, to be found in the court’s conception of what limitations are just and expedient or in accord 
with the rationale or ‘purpose’ of legal rules.”). Note that Hart and Honoré’s concept is intended 
to be grounded in (non-legal) “common-sense” causal principles rather than in scientific or 
philosophic notions of cause and effect in particular. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, 
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 1 (1st ed. 1959) [hereinafter HART & HONORÉ 1st ed.] (“[T]he assertion 
often made by the courts, especially in England, that it is the plain man’s notions of causation 
(and not the philosopher’s or the scientist’s) with which the law is concerned, seems to us to be 
true.”). Their account, however, has been criticized as introducing “criteria [that] are neither 
policy-neutral nor causal.” Wright, supra note 6, at 1746; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Theory 
of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 162 (1973) (“[Hart and Honoré’s] definition, and its 
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the Restatement Third’s rejection of the term “proximate cause” in favor of 
the term “scope of liability.”46 But it has been forcefully argued that cause-
in-fact, and not only proximate cause, entails policy choices; and exceptions 
to the but-for test are primary (although arguably not exclusive) reasons.47 
Although different theories of tort law may place varying degrees of 
emphasis on the importance of cause-in-fact,48 it is commonly believed that 
“policy considerations have no role to play in the determination of cause-in-
fact, ‘because no policy can be strong enough to warrant the imposition of 
liability for loss to which the defendant’s conduct has not in fact 
contributed.’”49 Furthermore, “[t]he [but-for] test [in particular] reflects a 
deeply rooted belief that a condition cannot be a cause of some event unless 
it is, in some sense, necessary for the occurrence of the event. This view is 
shared by lawyers, philosophers, scientists, and the general public.”50 But, 
then, substituting the substantial-factor test, or another altogether different 
standard, for the counterfactual model, which is built on this idea of the 
 
careful explication . . . have been rejected for the most part in the legal literature . . . .”). See 
generally Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 
433, 458–59 (2008). 
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmts. b, g (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010). 
47. See Malone, supra note 18, at 61–62, 88 (“even with reference to this issue of simple 
cause the mysterious relationship between policy and fact is likely to be in the foreground”; “[t]he 
very fact that a new definition of cause is needed in many situations indicates clearly that the but-
for rule does not always meet the policy requirements of law”); James E. Viator, When Cause-In-
Fact is More than a Fact: The Malone-Green Debate on the Role of Policy in Determining 
Factual Causation in Tort Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 1519, 1526 (1984) (“Torts commentators and 
courts generally recognize that the but-for test breaks down [in multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations]. In these two areas [“omissions and multiple sufficient causes”], the determination of 
cause-in-fact clearly involves normative policy choices . . . .”). 
48. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 229 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987) (asserting that “the idea of causation can largely be 
dispensed with in an economic analysis of torts”; and arguing that a “scholar does not need these 
terms; he can approach a case in which causation is an issue by asking how the case should be 
decided consistently with the Hand formula,” that is, with the underlying policy considerations). 
But see Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 84 (1975) (“Generally a causal link between an activity and an injury 
would be required. It would clearly be unproductive to try to induce a modification in conduct for 
the purpose of reducing injury costs unless we believed the conduct to be causally linked to those 
injury costs. To put it another way, how can a person be the cheapest cost avoider of an injury if 
his actions do not increase the chances that the injury will occur?”). See generally William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 
109 (1983); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of 
Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980). 
49. Viator, supra note 47, at 1526–27 (quoting J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 170 (6th ed. 
1983)) (remarking that “[a]lthough this maxim commands the general allegiance of even Wex 
Malone, he realized that its application can be troublesome”). 
50. Wright, supra note 6, at 1775. 
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necessary condition, in cases in which the counterfactual model is thought to 
fail, is problematic. As David Fischer remarked, in multiple-sufficient-cause 
cases, courts encounter an issue of policy: “They can retain the necessary 
cause requirement and exonerate the wrongdoer. Alternatively, they can 
dispense with the necessary cause requirement, and impose liability on the 
basis that defendant’s conduct simply was sufficient (in conjunction with the 
surrounding circumstances) to produce the result.”51 In other words, replacing 
the counterfactual model with a more “flexible” standard when the former is 
thought to fail abandons a factual inquiry based on a widely-accepted notion 
of cause and effect in favor of a policy decision aimed simply at obtaining 
the sought-after outcome. As the Supreme Court has stated, “tort law teaches 
that alternative and less demanding causal standards”—referring to such 
standards as “a kind of legal fiction or construct”—“are necessary in certain 
circumstances to vindicate the law’s purposes.”52 
In summary, the purported failure of the counterfactual model of causation 
when applied to multiple-sufficient-cause situations has caused courts and 
scholars to abandon the counterfactual model, at least as applied to these 
situations. As I explain in Part V, this effect has had far-reaching 
implications, well beyond the two-fire problem and other such situations in 
the torts context. 
III. POTENTIAL OUTCOMES: A FRAMEWORK FOR CAUSE AND EFFECT 
In this Part, I summarize the basic concepts underlying the potential 
outcomes framework and then discuss implications for the but-for standard 
and factual causation generally. 
A. Defining and Estimating Causal Effects 
Causal inference begins with formulating a precise definition of cause and 
effect. Consider circumstances in which an individual consults a doctor for 
 
51. David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1345 
(1992) (explaining that “[t]here are two reasons for using these alternative tests instead of the 
but-for test. First, the but-for test, as applied to this situation, seems to reach the wrong result. 
People reject the but-for test’s result (i.e., that neither of the twin fires caused the harm) because 
they intuitively believe that both fires in fact contributed to the destruction of the [lodge]. Second, 
the but-for test frustrates corrective justice considerations. Imposing liability avoids the unfairness 
of using the test’s cold logic to exonerate an identified wrongdoer at the expense of the innocent 
victim.” Id. at 1346.). 
52. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 452 (2014). See generally Wright, supra note 
6, 1738–39; Malone, supra note 18; HART & HONORÉ, supra note 32; HART & HONORÉ 1st ed., 
supra note 45; Epstein, supra note 45, at 162–63. 
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backpain. Let us assume that the doctor either provides pain medication or 
does not, and that the patient’s backpain will either persist or cease to persist 
after an hour.53 If we are interested in making conclusions regarding the 
causal effect of the pain medication on the patient’s backpain, we begin by 
defining a few fundamentals. First, we can define the patient as an 
experimental “unit,” which is something or someone at a particular point in 
time that we intend to expose to a “treatment.”54 A treatment is “an action or 
intervention that can be initiated or withheld from that unit” at that particular 
point in time.55 In this scenario, let us define two treatments: the 
administration of pain medication (the “active” treatment) and the 
administration of no pain medication (the “control” treatment).56 Next, we 
can define the patient’s backpain as an “outcome variable” of interest; and 
we can then define two “potential outcomes,” one associated with the 
administration of pain medication, denoted by Y(medication), and one 
associated with the administration of no medication, denoted by Y(no 
medication). A potential outcome is the outcome that would be realized if a 
unit receives a specific treatment—here, medication or no medication.57 
Therefore, there are four possibilities: Y(medication) = backpain, 
Y(medication) = no backpain, Y(no medication) = backpain, Y(no 
medication) = no backpain.58 We can then define the “unit-level” causal effect 
as a comparison between these potential outcomes.59 
Specifically, consider four possible comparisons based on the above 
potential outcomes: 1) Y(medication) = backpain vs. Y(no medication) = 
backpain; 2) Y(medication) = no backpain vs. Y(no medication) = backpain; 
 
53. See generally GUIDO W. IMBENS & DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL INFERENCE FOR 
STATISTICS, SOCIAL, AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES: AN INTRODUCTION 3–30 (2015). 
54. See id. at 5–6.  
55. Donald B. Rubin, The Design Versus the Analysis of Observational Studies for Causal 
Effects: Parallels with the Design of Randomized Trials, 26 STAT. MEDICINE 20, 22 (2007); see 
IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 4. 
56. The “more active” treatment is sometimes referred to as the “active treatment” whereas 
the “more passive” treatment is sometimes referred to as the “control treatment.” These “treatment 
levels” are often referred to simply as “treatment” and “control,” respectively, if doing so would 
not cause confusion. IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 4. 
57. Id. at 3–5. See generally D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 533 (2008). 
58. Throughout this article, I use terminology and notation based on the Rubin Causal 
Model. See Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and 
Nonrandomized Studies, 66(5) J. ED. PSYCH. 688 (1974) [hereinafter Rubin, Estimating Causal 
Effects]; Donald B. Rubin, Bayesian Inference for Causal Effects: The Role of Randomization, 6 
ANNALS STAT. 34 (1978) [hereinafter Rubin, Bayesian Inference]; Tirthankar Dasgupta et al., 
Causal Inference from 2K Factorial Designs by Using Potential Outcomes, 77(4) J. ROYAL STAT. 
SOC’Y SERIES B (STAT. METHODOLOGY) 727 (2015); IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53. 
59. See IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 5–7. 
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3) Y(medication) = backpain vs. Y(no medication) = no backpain; 4) 
Y(medication) = no backpain vs. Y(no medication) = no backpain.60 The first 
and fourth comparisons indicate no causal effect of medication whereas the 
second and third comparisons indicate a causal effect of medication—the 
second indicating pain relief and the third indicating prevention of pain 
relief.61 
In many situations, it may be more appropriate to measure the backpain, 
for example, using a scale of one to ten, rather than a binary measure. In this 
case, each of the two potential outcomes—Y(medication) and Y(no 
medication)—would equal one of multiple values, and the causal effect 
would again be defined in terms of a comparison between the two potential 
outcomes. For example, as summarized in Table 1, assuming a constant 
additive treatment effect and the potential outcomes Y(medication) = 4 and 
Y(no medication) = 8, the causal effect of medication would be -4 units of 
pain.62 
 
Table 1. Unit-Level Causal Effect 
Unit Y(medication) Y(no medication) Causal Effect 
Y(medication) – Y(no medication) 
1 4 8 -4 
 
Remember, there is no question here whether this difference, -4, is due to 
randomness or a true effect. Rather, we are assuming knowledge of the 
potential outcome under each level of treatment, medication or no 
medication. Similarly, it is important to understand that we are not 
conducting a comparison of values before and after medication or a 
comparison between the pain in one individual who has been given 
medication and one who has not. Rather, “the causal effect is the comparison 
of potential outcomes, for the same unit, at the same moment in time post-
treatment.”63 
Indeed, these cautions highlight “[t]he fundamental problem facing 
inference for causal effects”: “at most [only] one of the potential outcomes 
can be realized and thus observed.”64 In the example above, the doctor either 
administers medication or she does not; we therefore observe the potential 
outcome associated with one treatment level or the potential outcome 




62. See generally id. 
63. Id. at 6. 
64. Id. at 6; Rubin, Bayesian Inference, supra note 58, at 38. 
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1, the data point in either the second or third column must not exist, and 
therefore, the unit-level causal effect in the fourth column cannot be 
observed. For this reason, under the Rubin Causal Model, causal inference is 
said to be a “missing data problem”: “given any treatment assigned to an 
individual unit, the potential outcome associated with any alternate treatment 
is missing.”65 
Describing causal inference as a missing data problem highlights the 
important point that causal effects cannot be observed, but rather must be 
inferred. They must be estimated. In the example above, we can observe one 
of two potential outcomes—the one associated with the level of treatment 
that is in fact applied to the unit. This is insufficient to determine a causal 
effect; but causal effects may be inferred by inferring unobserved potential 
outcomes.66 
In general, to estimate a causal effect, we can use “replication.” That is, 
we can test the intervention (e.g., medication) in an “experiment” by exposing 
multiple units to different treatments.67 For each replication, we can observe 
the potential outcome associated with the assigned treatment, but not those 
associated with alternative assignments. But now, armed with multiple data 
points, we can impute missing data points and estimate causal effects. 
Consider, for example, an experiment to test the effect of the pain 
medication in the example above. Table 2 illustrates possible results for such 
an experiment. As described, for each unit, we can observe one potential 
outcome. For unit 1, who was assigned the treatment “medication,” we 
observe a pain level of 4. Because she was assigned “medication” rather than 
“no medication,” we cannot observe her pain level had she received no 
medication; and therefore, we cannot observe the unit-level causal effect for 
unit 1. For unit 2, who was assigned the treatment “no medication,” we 
observe a pain level of 7. We cannot, however, observe his pain level under 
the counterfactual in which he had received “medication.” And so on and so 
forth. 
 
Table 2.  Causal Inference:  A Missing Data Problem 
Unit Y(1=medication) Y(0=no medication) Causal Effect 
 
1 4 ? ? 
2 ? 7 ? 
3 ? 9 ? 
 
65. IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 14; see also Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects, supra 
note 58. 
66. See IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 14. 
67. See id. at 3–30. 
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4 3 ? ? 
… … … … 
n 3 ? ? 
 𝒀"𝒐𝒃𝒔(𝟏) = 	𝟑. 𝟑 𝒀"𝒐𝒃𝒔(𝟎) = 𝟖 𝒀"𝒐𝒃𝒔(𝟏) − 𝒀"𝒐𝒃𝒔(𝟎) = −𝟒. 𝟕 
 
To estimate the causal effect, we seek to impute the missing data. A 
convenient (but not always suitable) approach is to use the mean of the 
observations for each treatment to impute the missing data for that treatment. 
For example, in Table 2, we can use 𝑌3456(1) =	3.3 to impute the missing 
values for Y(medication) and 𝑌3456(0) =	8 to impute the missing values for 
Y(no medication), where 𝑌3456(1) refers to the mean of the observed potential 
outcomes across the units when assigned to “medication” and 𝑌3456(0) refers 
to the mean of the observed potential outcomes across the units when 
assigned to “no medication.” Once we have imputed the missing potential 
outcomes, we can estimate the causal effect based on a specified definition. 
For example, we might have defined the “population-level” causal effect to 
be the additive difference between the mean of the potential outcomes 
associated with the treatment level “medication” (𝑌3(1)) and the mean of the 
potential outcomes associated with the treatment level “no medication” 
(𝑌3(0)), which, in Table 2, we could estimate to be -4.7 using the means of 
the observed potential outcomes.68 There are well-established methods of 
inferring causal effects both at the population level and at the unit level.69 
Note also that implicit in this and other causal inferences under the Rubin 
Causal Model are two important assumptions: 1) that the treatment assigned 
to one unit does not affect another unit’s outcome; and 2) that there are no 
different, or “hidden,” versions of each treatment level.70 
Thus, as illustrated in the example above, using these assumptions we can 
estimate causal effects through replication. But, as mentioned earlier, any 
replication will necessarily be imperfect, since a unit exists only at a single 
point in time. For example, if we assign an individual to “medication” on 
Monday and assign the same individual to “no medication” on Tuesday, and 
compare the pain levels for each, this comparison involves two units: the 
individual on Monday and the individual on Tuesday. Similarly, if we use 
identical twins and assign one to “medication” and the other to “no 
 
68. For a description of Jerzy Neyman’s “repeated sampling” approach, see IMBENS & 
RUBIN, supra note 53, at 83–84.  
69. For a recent experiment using “Fisher’s method” and the potential outcomes framework, 
see Hillel J. Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-Case Guidance on Awards for 
Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 37 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405 (2019). The Rubin Causal Model allows inference using Neyman’s 
approach or Fisher’s approach. See Rubin, Bayesian Inference, supra note 58. 
70. IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 9–13. 
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medication” at the same point in time, this comparison also involves two 
units: each twin at the same point in time. The replication is necessarily 
imperfect, since even identical twins differ to some degree, as does an 
individual on Monday compared to the same individual on Tuesday—let 
alone, different (non-twin) individuals at different times.   
Imperfect replication can degrade the imputation of missing potential 
outcomes and the estimation of causal effects. Specifically, if the background 
characteristics of the different units, such as age, gender, race, etc.—variables 
known as “covariates”—differ from one unit to the next, we do not know 
whether the difference in outcome (for example, pain level) is due to the 
difference in treatment or the difference in covariates.71 For example, if 
subjects in the above experiment are recruited from a population of young 
adults, and these subjects are permitted to choose between receiving 
medication for backpain or receiving no medication, then a comparison 
between the average pain level of those who received medication and the 
average pain level of those who received no medication may be misleading. 
For example, if the medication contains a substance known to be harmful to 
fetuses or breastfed infants, the units in the “no medication” group may be 
disproportionately women, and the units in the “medication” group 
disproportionately men, because a proportion of the population from which 
the subjects were recruited consisted of women who were pregnant or 
breastfeeding and did not want to risk injuring their fetuses or infants with 
the medication. Meanwhile women (and pregnant or breastfeeding women in 
particular) may have different pain thresholds than men, or perhaps may rate 
pain differently than men; therefore, any observed effect may be due not to 
the medication, but to differences in covariates, and specifically proportions 
of men and women, in each treatment group. 
Furthermore, regardless whether the units in the “no medication” group 
are disproportionately women, they may consist of subjects with 
disproportionately low pre-treatment pain levels (also a covariate like race 
and gender). After all, subjects with high pain levels may be more likely to 
choose medication over no medication. As above, any observed effect may 
therefore be due not to the medication, but to differences in pre-treatment 
pain levels in the two treatment groups. 
This example illustrates the importance of “covariate balance” across 
treatment groups. It also illustrates the importance of a concept known as the 
 
71. A covariate is a background characteristic that cannot be affected by the treatment 
condition to which a unit is assigned. For example, whether a unit is assigned to “medication” or 
“no medication” will not change the unit’s gender. On the other hand, the unit’s temperature could 
be affected by whether the unit receives medication or no medication and is therefore not a 
covariate. See id. at 15–16. 
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“assignment mechanism,” which determines how each unit “[comes] to 
receive the treatment level actually received.”72 
To achieve covariate balance in the experimental context, a researcher 
may seek to use a “randomized experiment,” in which the treatment 
assignments are random. Often, however (including in many torts contexts), 
randomization is not possible. For example, for a case involving the question 
whether a botched heart surgery of a certain type caused heart failure, a 
researcher could not ethically conduct a randomized experiment in which she 
would randomize which patients receive botched heart surgeries and which 
do not in order to determine the effect of botched surgeries on heart failure. 
Similarly, if it is known that exposure to asbestos may have a range of 
harmful effects, a researcher likely could not randomize exposure to asbestos 
to test its effects on human health. Further, even under circumstances in 
which a randomized experiment is ethically permissible, it may be ruled out 
due to the high costs that such studies entail. 
Randomized experiments are the “gold standard” for making causal 
inferences.73 But in circumstances in which randomization is not possible, it 
may be appropriate to conduct an “observational study,” which is a study in 
which the researcher does not control the assignment of treatments to units.74 
For example, the researcher may use existing data regarding exposures to 
asbestos and associated health outcomes. The problem with observational 
studies is that, because the researcher is unable to control the assignment 
mechanism, it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether there is 
covariate balance, and therefore whether an observed disparity in an outcome 
variable is due to a causal effect or to a covariate imbalance. Indeed, a well-
designed observational study will often attempt to “approximate, or attempt 
to replicate, a randomized experiment.”75 This may involve comparing the 
outcomes of units that are similar to each other—that is, that have similar 
covariates—but that receive different treatment conditions. This is a 
challenging exercise, and, even if possible, it will be difficult to ascertain that 
all relevant variables have been identified and balanced. One method of 
 
72. Id. at 13–15. 
73. Rubin, supra note 55, at 20. 
74. See IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 31, 41–42. An observational study can be 
described as “an empiric investigation in which ‘the objective is to elucidate cause-and-effect 
relationships . . . [in which] it is not feasible to use controlled experimentation, in the sense of 
being able to impose the procedures or treatments whose effects it is desired to discover, or to 
assign subjects at random to different procedures.’” PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATION AND 
EXPERIMENTATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO CAUSAL INFERENCE 65 (2017) (quoting William G. 
Cochran, The Planning of Observational Studies of Human Populations (with Discussion), 128 J. 
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y, SERIES A (GEN.) 234, 234 (1965)). 
75. Rubin, supra note 55, at 25. 
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simultaneously balancing numerous covariates is to use a device called 
“propensity scores,” which provide the probability that a unit will receive a 
certain treatment, given the unit’s covariates.76 A propensity score can be 
understood as a summary value reflecting a unit’s array of covariate values.77 
Covariate balance, however, is not the only reason to design an 
observational study to replicate a randomized experiment. A major theme 
underlying the potential outcomes framework is the importance of carefully 
defining causal questions and causal effects. This entails precision in defining 
“primitive concepts,” such as units, treatments, and outcome variables,78 as 
well as estimands—the objects we want to estimate (e.g., a causal effect)—
and estimators—the objects that we intend to use to estimate the estimands 
in light of imperfect information (e.g., a formula based on average observed 
outcomes). A primary purpose for designing an observational study to 
replicate a randomized experiment is thus to facilitate good study design with 
well-defined causal effects. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand that the potential outcomes 
framework is more than simply a set of methods for analyzing data. Indeed, 
although the discussion of “replication” above relates to methods for inferring 
causal effects from data—methods that are useful in many torts contexts 
involving questions of cause and effect—a central feature of the potential 
outcomes framework is its simple and intuitive structure for defining cause 
and effect. It is a framework for conceptualizing causal questions and causal 
effects, regardless whether the method to be applied for inferring causal 
effects is based on replication and a formal dataset or simply on a trier of fact 
that draws inferences from the evidence presented at a trial. 
B. Implications for But-For Causation in Multiple-Sufficient-Cause 
Situations 
In this section, I explain the relationship between but-for causation and the 
potential outcomes framework and implications of this relationship for the 
role of but-for causation for resolving causal questions involving multiple 
sufficient causes. 
Factual Causation and Scientific Cause and Effect. Factual causation 
is intended to capture the meaning of “actual,” or “scientific,” cause and 
 
76. See Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score 
in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41, 41 (1983). 
77. See generally id.; Rubin, supra note 55. See also Greiner, supra note 57, at 574–75. 
78. Greiner, supra note 57, at 558. 
51:0879] COUNTERFACTUAL CAUSATION 901 
 
effect.79 It is conceptualized as such, and, in many cases (such as toxic tort 
cases), courts accept and sometimes require (or at least hold as the “gold 
standard”) proof of causation through statistical evidence establishing a 
causal connection between a defendant’s misconduct and a plaintiff’s 
injury.80 Indeed, the factual causation inquiry can be understood as an 
 
79. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 313–14 (referring to “factual cause problem[s] [that] 
center[] on scientific doubt, or at least on lay ignorance about the connection between the 
defendant’s acts and the plaintiff’s injury”; “[t]hese causal issues raise questions of fact in the 
scientific sense”; “the plaintiff must . . . present evidence that causation is not merely scientifically 
possible, but that it existed in her particular case”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 264–65 
(“This question of ‘fact’ ordinarily is one upon which all the learning, literature and lore of the 
law are largely lost. It is a matter upon which lay opinion is quite as competent as that of the most 
experienced court.”); see also Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–11 (2014) (“A thing 
‘results’ when it ‘[a]rise[s] as an effect, issue, or outcome from some action, process or design.’ 
‘Results from’ imposes, in other words, a requirement of actual causality. ‘In the usual course,’ 
this requires proof ‘“that the harm would not have occurred” in the absence of—that is, but for—
the defendant’s conduct.’” (internal citations omitted)); Lawrence Crocker, A Retributive Theory 
of Criminal Causation, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 65, 67 (1994) (“Judges comment from 
time to time on how difficult is the concept of legal or proximate causation in comparison to the 
straightforward concept variously referred to as ‘cause in fact’ or ‘scientific’ or ‘but for’ 
causation. Philosophers of science, by contrast, are inclined towards the view that scientific 
causation or cause in fact is terribly difficult.”) (citing sources); Viator, supra note 47, at 1523 
(“The Green methodology first confines the causation issue to a neutral, purely scientific inquiry, 
namely, cause-in-fact or what Green calls either causal relation or causal connection.”). 
80. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(“epidemiology is the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort case”; “where 
epidemiology is available, it cannot be ignored”); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 
307, 311 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Undoubtedly, the most useful and conclusive type of evidence in a 
case such as this is epidemiological studies.”); Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 
92CV0314LEKRWS, 2001 WL 967608, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2001) (“In the mass torts 
context, epidemiology is the best evidence of causation.”); In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 
2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (“[e]pidemiology is the best evidence of causation in the mass 
torts context”; “epidemiological studies are necessary to determine the cause and effect between 
breast implants and allegedly associated diseases”); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. 
MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); Burton v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Div. of Am. Home 
Prod. Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. 
Havner, 953 S.W.2d  706, 715 (Tex. 1997)) (stating that when “direct” evidence of specific 
causation “is unavailable, claimants may attempt to demonstrate an increased risk posed by 
exposure to the substance in question in an effort to establish causation; this is generally done 
through epidemiological studies”); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 
1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing epidemiological studies) aff’d sub nom. In re Agent Orange 
Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715 
(“[W]hen the incidence of a disease or injury is sufficiently elevated due to exposure to a 
substance, someone who was exposed to that substance and exhibits the disease or injury can raise 
a fact question on causation.”); David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on 
Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 218 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining 
that “randomized controlled experiments”—the gold standard for answering questions of 
causality—“are ideally suited for demonstrating causation”). (Note that the Reference Manual on 
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observational study designed by the court based on the law, in which a trier 
of fact draws inferences from evidence and makes causal conclusions.81   
To be sure, factual causation is frequently described as causation in the 
“ordinary,” “plain,” or “common” sense of the term. But it is important to 
understand that this “ordinary” meaning of causation correlates extremely 
well with, if it is not altogether equivalent to, the scientific meaning of cause 
and effect. Like the scientific meaning, the “ordinary” meaning captures the 
idea of the counterfactual, and of the but-for concept in particular, as has been 
confirmed repeatedly by the Supreme Court.82 
Furthermore, to determine the “ordinary” meaning of causation, we can 
examine entries for the term in well-established dictionaries. Such entries 
frequently serve as the Supreme Court’s primary source when interpreting 
the “ordinary meaning” of statutory language. In particular, to interpret a 
statute, the Supreme Court “begin[s] with the language employed by 
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose”;83 in determining the “ordinary 
meaning” of the statutory language, the Court examines entries for the terms 
at issue in well-established dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster and Oxford 
Dictionaries.84 
 
Scientific Evidence uses the term “causation” to refer to “the task of attributing cause and effect” 
in both legal and scientific contexts. Jerome P. Kassirer & Gladys Kessler, Preface to REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE xiii, xiii–xiv (3d ed. 2011).) See generally David Rosenberg, 
The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) (discussing “weak” and “strong” rules). The potential outcomes 
framework itself has been used in litigation and has appeared or has been the subject of discussion 
in a number of law review articles. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? 
Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L. J. 2270 (2012); 
Greiner, supra note 57 (applying the potential outcomes framework to the civil rights litigation 
context); Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal 
Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17 (2011). See also Donald B. Rubin, Estimating the Causal 
Effects of Smoking, 20 STAT. MEDICINE 1395, 1410–12 (2001) (analyzing causal effects of alleged 
misconduct of the tobacco industry, and discussing apportionment of damages in circumstances 
involving alleged misconduct of tobacco and asbestos industries). 
81. The potential outcomes framework, which integrates concepts such as causal estimands 
and causal estimators, unit-level causal effects, and population-level causal effects, would 
arguably facilitate a tighter integration of legal standards of causation and standards of scientific 
proof of causation, and perhaps a range of other causation-related concepts—for example, the 
concepts of “probabilistic” causation and “actual” causation. See generally Wright & Puppe, 
supra note 10, at 496–97 (“[Guido Calabresi] also included a ‘causal linkage’ concept, which is 
more accurately described as a ‘probabilistic linkage,’ since it merely refers to ex ante increased 
risk . . . .”). 
82. See, e.g., Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210–11; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 
176–77 (2009). 
83. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
84. See, e.g., Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210–11; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
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Thus, examining the entries for the term “causation” in these dictionaries, 
the definitions provided in Merriam-Webster are “the act or process of 
causing” and “the act or agency which produces an effect”; and in Oxford 
Dictionaries, “[t]he action of causing something” and “[t]he relationship 
between cause and effect; causality.”85 Most illuminating for our purposes are 
the “example sentences” in each entry. The first two examples provided by 
Merriam-Webster are, “the role of heredity in the causation of cancer,” and 
“in a complex situation causation is likely to be multiple”; and by Oxford 
Dictionaries, “the postulated role of nitrate in the causation of cancer,” and 
“a strong association is not a proof of causation.”86 It is clear from these 
example sentences, as well as the definitions provided, that the dictionary 
meaning of the term causation, and thus the “ordinary meaning” of the term 
causation (based on the Supreme Court’s frequent analysis for deriving the 
ordinary meaning of causal terms and terms generally), is intended to capture 
the scientific concept of cause and effect. 
If factual causation entails scientific cause and effect, then the law should 
look to the sciences to inform its causal framework. The predominant 
scientific model (or at least a predominant scientific model) for asking and 
answering questions of cause and effect is the potential outcomes framework. 
This framework provides an ideal setting in which to conceptualize multiple-
sufficient-cause problems and factual causation generally. 
But-For Causation and the Counterfactual Model. A central theme of 
this article is that factual causation cannot be defined simply by a narrow test 
to be applied rigidly to every situation. Rather, it is a theoretical framework 
for establishing a defined connection between a defendant’s act and a 
plaintiff’s injury. Different circumstances may call for different applications 
of this framework in examining such a connection. For most cases, a rigid 
“test” may suffice; but complex cases, and specifically, those involving 
multiple sufficient causes, require additional nuance. This nuance is supplied 
by the broader counterfactual model, the potential outcomes framework. 
The but-for conception of causation fundamentally entails a comparison 
of counterfactuals corresponding to some defined intervention. In particular, 
however, but-for causation should be understood as a specific measure of 
interest, or “estimand,” within the potential outcomes framework. In other 
words, the potential outcomes model supplies a broad framework for defining 
and answering causal questions through counterfactual reasoning, one 
 
85. Causation, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/causation 
[https://perma.cc/GPL5-6QJU] (last visited Sept. 8, 2019); Causation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/causation [https://perma.cc/LD2Z-MCPC] (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2019). 
86. LEXICO, supra note 85; MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 85. 
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specific aspect of which is the but-for measure. But, it is the broader 
counterfactual model, the potential outcomes framework, and not the specific 
but-for measure, that the law intends to capture in the factual causation 
inquiry. After all, this inquiry is intended to be one of “actual,” or “scientific,” 
cause and effect, which is precisely what the potential outcomes framework 
represents.87  
The but-for measure in particular, although logically appropriate as a 
measure of interest in single-factor problems, is not necessarily a sensible 
estimand in multiple-sufficient-cause problems, at least not if the law seeks a 
measure that is consistent with both common and scientific reasoning 
regarding cause and effect. The potential outcomes framework, however, 
allows for alternative measures that build on the same counterfactual 
reasoning that is central to the but-for standard but that are refined for 
multiple-factor problems. In the following Parts, I introduce these 
alternatives by describing and applying the “factorial” approach to multiple 
sufficient causes. 
Prior to proceeding to the factorial approach, however, it is important to 
note that there are two ways to understand applications of the potential 
outcomes framework to multiple-sufficient-cause problems. Under the first 
understanding, the potential outcomes framework carries important 
implications for the but-for standard of causation directly. According to this 
understanding, the but-for standard is itself intended to entail scientific cause 
and effect and the broader counterfactual model, but it has been defined by 
courts too narrowly, such that it is not in fact capturing the full extent of the 
notions that it entails. The potential outcomes framework, therefore, informs 
and expands it to entail a broader set of estimands—and specifically, 
estimands that may be more suitable for resolving multiple-sufficient-cause 
problems. 
Under the second understanding, the but-for standard maintains its narrow 
meaning and excludes the broader counterfactual reasoning of the potential 
outcomes framework. Using this understanding, however, the but-for 
standard should be understood only as a specific measure within the potential 
outcomes framework and not necessarily applicable to 
multiple-sufficient-cause situations. As such, the law should look to the 
broader potential outcomes framework, and not necessarily the but-for 
measure, to ask and answer causal questions involving multiple sufficient 
causes. 
 
87. Note, the factual nature of the causal question in the potential outcomes framework is 
highlighted by Donald Rubin’s frequent remark that causal inference is a missing data problem: 
the structure of the inquiry places the focus on the inference of unobserved, or “missing,” potential 
outcomes. See, e.g., IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 53, at 14. 
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Both of these understandings are valid. The first understanding has the 
advantage of highlighting that, as applied to multiple sufficient causes, the 
potential outcomes framework is simply a logical extension of the basic 
counterfactual concept that gives rise to the but-for standard. The second 
understanding has the advantage of maintaining the current meaning of 
but-for causation while placing it in a broader context that allows for a more 
refined approach to complex causal problems. 
IV. A “FACTORIAL” APPROACH TO MULTIPLE SUFFICIENT CAUSES  
Whether the counterfactual model of causation can account for cases 
involving multiple sufficient causes and how it treats these cases have 
important implications. In this Part, I show that the counterfactual model does 
not fail in multiple-sufficient-cause situations. Rather, if employed with 
proper nuance, it yields results that are consistent with intuition and court 
decisions. I apply a “factorial” approach in the potential outcomes framework 
to show that both factors in the concurrent multiple-sufficient-cause problem 
and the first factor in the successive multiple-sufficient-cause problem can be 
understood as actual causes of the destructive outcomes in those problems. 
A. Concurrent Multiple Sufficient Causes in a Multi-Treatment Setting 
The key to properly applying the counterfactual model to these complex 
problems is to conceptualize the problems in a way that reflects their 
complexity. We can accomplish this by applying the potential outcomes 
framework in a multi-treatment setting. Let us take the two-fire problem as 
an example. To start, let us use a basic principle of the Rubin Causal Model, 
discussed above, that observational studies should be designed and 
conceptualized to replicate a randomized experiment.88 We begin by defining 
 
88. See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. As discussed supra, in addition to 
facilitating balance of covariates across treatment conditions, approaching an observational 
problem in this fashion, both conceptually and methodologically, allows the researcher to 
construct the problem rigorously, including carefully defining units, treatments, outcome 
variables, and causal effects. As Donald Rubin has emphasized, “A crucial idea when trying to 
estimate causal effects from an observational dataset is to conceptualize the observational dataset 
as having arisen from a complex randomized experiment, where the rules used to assign the 
treatment conditions have been lost and must be reconstructed.” Donald B. Rubin, For Objective 
Causal Inference, Design Trumps Analysis, 2 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 808, 815 (2008). 
Frequently, rigorous design is lost in observational studies—whether in law or in the sciences. A 
problem is observed in retrospect and the study is mistakenly designed to reflect that perspective. 
But our conception of an intervention should not change based on whether a researcher conducts 
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foundational concepts, such as treatments and outcome variables.89 Because 
there are two factors at issue—Fire A and Fire B—we can adopt a multi-
treatment, or “factorial,” design in which we define two treatments. This 
“factorial” approach to the problem, although not necessary to make the 
argument herein, provides a clear way of understanding and analyzing 
multiple-sufficient-cause situations. 
The classical but-for approach to the two-fire problem effectively 
compares the potential outcome associated with the occurrence of the fire at 
issue to the potential outcome associated with a state of the world in which 
the fire had not occurred, given the occurrence of the other fire. This approach 
treats each fire abstractly (i.e., individually) in the sense that it views each 
fire as a single intervention conditioned on the existence of the other fire. But, 
approaching the problem as a two-factor, rather than a single-factor, problem 
allows examination of a broader range of effects, and thereby a more 
comprehensive understanding of the fires’ roles in destroying the lodge than 
we obtain using a single-factor design. 
When there is only a single factor, the counterfactuals under the but-for 
conception are straightforward: we ask simply, what would have happened 
had the intervention not occurred? When there are two factors that are both 
treated as interventions, however, the counterfactuals are more complex: we 
want to know what would have happened had the first intervention not 
occurred and what would have happened had the second intervention not 
occurred. For example, in the concurrent two-fire problem, we consider what 
would have happened had Fire A not occurred and also what would have 
happened had Fire B not occurred. 
Using this model requires that we further specify what is meant by 
causation. It can mean different things. For example, concerning the effect of 
 
a prospective experiment or an observational study. “As a consequence of our conceptualization 
of an observational study’s data as having arisen from a hypothetical randomized experiment, the 
first activity is to think hard about that hypothetical experiment. To start, what exactly were the 
treatment conditions and what exactly were the outcome (or response) variables?” Id. Note that 
this approach arguably addresses (or is at least relevant to) a common criticism of the but-for 
standard—that it captures a multitude of events as causes that are in fact irrelevant to the legal 
conception of causation. The potential outcomes framework, in a sense, takes a prospective 
conceptual approach to causality; and this is useful for conceptualizing causation in light of the 
uncountable events that have led to a plaintiff’s injury. The approach requires carefully defining 
interventions of interest, as distinct from the infinite events that have possibly led to a 
hypothesized effect. 
89. It is interesting and perhaps useful—although beyond the scope of the current article—
to consider whether experimental design and the potential outcomes framework could apply in 
certain contexts to facilitate a more concrete approach to proximate causation by characterizing 
the inquiry in terms of a randomized experiment that examines the effect of a defined intervention 
on a defined outcome variable through “samples” of hypothetical worlds that feature either 
treatment or control conditions.  
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Fire A, it can refer to a comparison between potential outcomes when Fire A 
occurs and when Fire A does not occur, conditional on the occurrence of Fire 
B; or it can refer to an unconditional comparison between potential outcomes 
when Fire A occurs and when Fire A does not occur—in effect, aggregating 
over potential outcomes when Fire B does and does not occur. These distinct 
estimands, sometimes referred to as “interaction effects” and “main effects,” 
respectively, may lead to different conclusions, that is, a finding of “no 
causation” for one but “causation” for the other. 
Let us examine these effects in greater detail by applying a factorial design 
within the potential outcomes framework. This involves examining the 
effects of the fires—the factors—on the destruction of the lodge—the 
outcome variable—under various “treatment combinations.”90 Each 
treatment combination involves a set of factors, where each factor is set to a 
specific “level.”91 For example, the lodge in the two fire problem may be 
exposed to a treatment combination that involves the factors Fire A and Fire 
B, where Fire A is set to the level “on” and Fire B is set to the level “off.” 
Using this design, we can study the main effect of each factor on the outcome 
variable—that is, the effect of each factor aggregated over the levels of the 
other factor—as well as interaction effects, or the effects of each factor 
conditional on a specific level of the other factor.92 Both sets of effects are 
based on the counterfactual model; and our intuition regarding causation in 
multi-factor problems likely derives from both main effects and interaction 
effects. 
Consider the concurrent two-fire problem in the context of a “2x2 factorial 
design,” involving two factors, Fire A and Fire B, each having two levels, 
“on” and “off.”  Let us define the outcome variable as a binary variable Y that 
equals 1 if the lodge is destroyed and 0 if the lodge is not destroyed. 
First, we are interested in knowing the potential outcome associated with 
each combination of the two factors. The 2x2 table in Figure 1 illustrates 
these potential outcomes, where, by assumption in the concurrent two-fire 
problem, each fire is independently sufficient to destroy the lodge. 
 
 Fire A = off Fire A = on 
Fire B = off Not Destroyed Destroyed 
 
90. See Dasgupta et al., supra note 58, at 727; see also Bavli & Mozer, supra note 69, at 
420. 
91. See Dasgupta et al., supra note 58, at 727. 
92. See generally id. 
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Fire B = on Destroyed Destroyed 
Figure 1.  2x2 table illustrating potential outcomes associated 
with treatment combinations involving two factors, Fire A 
and Fire B, each having two levels, “on” and “off.” 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the lodge is destroyed for the combinations (Fire 
A = on, Fire B = on), (Fire A = off, Fire B = on), (Fire A = on, Fire B = off), 
but is not destroyed for the combination (Fire A = off, Fire B = off).93 
Distinguish estimands from estimators. In this Part, we are interested in 
defining estimands. That is, assuming we have all the data we could need 
(which we indeed have in Figure 1), what value are we interested in 
knowing—specifically, how should we define a causal effect? 
Using numerical values to represent “destroyed” (1) and “not destroyed” 
(0), we can define interaction and main effects. In these terms, the traditional 
but-for approach to the concurrent two-fire problem would effectively focus 
solely on the interaction effects of each fire94—for example, determining the 
interaction effect of Fire A when Fire B is “on” by contrasting the potential 
outcomes when Fire A is “on” and when Fire A is “off,” given that Fire B is 
“on.” Using the notation above, we can calculate this interaction effect to be 
1 – 1 = 0. As expected, there is no causal effect of Fire A when conditioning 
on the existence of Fire B. 
But the traditional approach altogether ignores the main effects of each 
fire. These effects account for two sets of counterfactuals: when Fire A is 
“on” versus “off” and when Fire B is “on” versus “off.” In particular, the 
main effect of Fire A on the lodge’s destruction is based on a comparison 
between an aggregation of both potential outcomes when Fire A is “on” 
(aggregated over the two possibilities (“on” and “off”) for Fire B) and an 
aggregation of both potential outcomes when Fire A is “off” (again 
aggregated over the two possibilities for Fire B). As a simplified example, 
we can define the unit-level main effect of Fire A as the additive difference 
between the mean potential outcome when Fire A is “on” and the mean 
potential outcome when Fire A is “off,” and the unit-level main effect of Fire 
B as the additive difference between the mean potential outcome when Fire 
B is “on” and the mean potential outcome when Fire B is “off.”95 When 
determining the effect of one fire, this comparison aggregates over the 
 
93. See generally id. at 731–32.  
94. In actuality, the traditional approach does not account for both fires simultaneously as 
interventions and seek to understand how these interventions “interact”; rather it considers each 
fire individually and assumes that all other features of the problem remain constant, including the 
existence of the other fire. 
95. This is only one of many possible definitions we could consider. 
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various levels of the other fire. Therefore, using these definitions, the 
unit-level main effect of Fire A can be written as (1+1)/2 – (1+0)/2 = 1 – ½ 
= ½ = 50%. Similarly, using these definitions, the unit-level main effect of 
Fire B can be written as ½, or 50%. 
This particular estimand—i.e., aggregating using the mean—is presented 
for illustrative purposes only and is not meant as a prescription for a main-
effects analysis in multiple-sufficient-cause situations. Indeed, there are 
many ways one could aggregate over potential outcomes and compare those 
aggregations when each factor is on versus off. In the current Part, I introduce 
the main-effects analysis as an alternative within the counterfactual model to 
the traditional but-for measure, and I explain its logic and applicability. In the 
following Part, I argue in favor of a particular estimand—and specifically, 
that this method can be applied in practice through the causal-set approach of 
the NESS test and the Restatement Third. 
Note that, assuming use of the above estimand (employing the mean 
potential outcome), the values that this main-effects analysis generate (50% 
and 50%) can be interpreted to yield a legal outcome. One possibility is to 
interpret them in terms of proportions: as indicating that Fire A and Fire B 
share equally in causing the destruction of the lodge. It is important, however, 
not to confuse the percent effect defined in the factorial design with the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard frequently applied to proof of 
causation. The former does not represent a level of proof. Similarly, it does 
not represent a percent increase in risk.96 Distinguish this result from the 
statement, “starting a fire is causal in that it increases the risk of destroying 
the lodge.”97 A 50% effect could, in certain contexts, be used to indicate an 
increase in risk, but this is not how it should be interpreted generally. Our 
result is not probabilistic: we know with certainty what will happen for each 
combination of factors, and our result is based entirely on these combinations. 
Each percent value represents the proportion of combinations of the 
interventions for which the lodge is destroyed when each intervention (i.e., 
each fire) is “on” versus “off.” This proportion can then serve as the basis for 
a legal rule to apportion liability. 
 
96. Courts sometimes fail to distinguish between estimands—the things we want to 
estimate, such as causal effects—and estimators—what we use to estimate causal effects and other 
estimands. For example, in determining whether a plaintiff has established beyond a 
preponderance of the evidence that x caused y, a court may combine the increased risk of an 
outcome required to satisfy the preponderance standard and the confidence that the trier of fact 
should have in the evidence proving that increased risk. In any event, the percentage effect defined 
in the factorial design is distinct from any percentage used to characterize a standard of proof. 
97. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 48, at 71 (“There is a causal link between an act or 
activity and an injury when we conclude on the basis of the available evidence that the recurrence 
of that act or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur.”). 
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For example, the analysis above and resulting proportions could form the 
basis of legal rules involving apportionment based on causation or even joint 
and several liability.98 For the latter, each fire can be characterized as a cause 
of an indivisible injury, the destruction of the lodge.  
Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce 
an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot 
be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual 
wrongdoers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally 
liable for the entire damages and the injured party may proceed to 
judgment against any one separately or against all in one suit.99 
Relying on a main-effects analysis, each fire can be understood as a cause of 
the destruction of the lodge, and as having joined with the other fire “to 
produce an indivisible injury.”100 
Ultimately, defining the unit-level main effect of each fire as the additive 
difference between the mean potential outcome when the fire is “on” and the 
mean potential outcome when the fire is “off”—and particularly, employing 
 
98. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. §§ 17, 26 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 878 (“The principle of causal 
apportionment can apply between a plaintiff and a defendant as well as between defendants, as 
where the defendant’s asbestos causes lung damage and the plaintiff’s smoking causes a different 
lung damage, with both contributing to a shortness of breath.  If evidence shows a basis for saying 
that the asbestos caused 90% of the disability, the defendant will be liable only for that portion of 
the harm. If no evidence shows a basis for causal apportionment, the court may allocate liability 
in proportion to fault or responsibility instead, unless special considerations of public policy bar 
fault apportionment.”); DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 192 (2d ed. 2018) (“When 
the plaintiff presents evidence that she suffered a single or indivisible injury at the hands of two 
or more tortfeasors, the burden is on the party who seeks to avoid responsibility for the entire 
damages to prove the magnitude of divisible damages. The effect of this rule is that when the 
plaintiff suffers injuries that are similar in nature or consequences, so that they cannot be separated 
in any practical way and cannot be attributed separately to the separate tortfeasors, each tortfeasor 
is treated as a cause of the entire indivisible injury. Under this rule, causal apportionment 
generally does not apply to indivisible injuries. Instead, a court must either seek an apportionment 
based on fault or responsibility, or hold multiple defendants jointly and severally liable.”) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2000)). 
See also Rubin, supra note 80, at 1410–12 (applying causal framework to apportionment of 
damages in “joint causation” situation involving combined “misconduct of the asbestos and 
tobacco industries,” and describing “three counterfactual worlds: the world without misconduct 
by the tobacco industry, . . . the world without misconduct by the asbestos industry, . . . and the 
world without misconduct by either industry”). 
99. Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. 1952); see also 
In re Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 262 n.29 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (Sept. 29, 
2016) (“Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, ‘[i]f the tortious conduct of each of two 
or more persons is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to liability for 
the entire harm, irrespective of whether their conduct is concurring or consecutive.’”) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 879 (AM. LAW INST.1979)). 
100. Landers, 248 S.W.2d at 734. 
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the mean to aggregate potential outcomes, as in the illustration above—can 
lead to various difficulties. Some estimands are better than others. But the 
point is this: Defining causal effects using main effects rather than interaction 
effects (and a but-for measure in particular) allows an estimand that accounts 
for both sets of counterfactuals and therefore all four potential outcomes in 
the 2x2 matrix in Figure 1; and this analysis is a logical and well-accepted 
application of counterfactual reasoning to define causal effects in the 
potential outcomes framework, and one that leads to sensible conclusions. 
B. Why Employ a Main-Effects Analysis: A Logical Explanation 
The above analysis leads to results that are consistent with intuition and 
court decisions without resorting to exceptions to the counterfactual model.101 
But an obvious question is this: the factorial approach models causal effects 
as potentially based on main effects, interaction effects, or perhaps both; but 
if it is known that two fires in fact occurred, why, when determining the 
effects of either of the two fires, should we not automatically condition on 
the occurrence of the other fire? Even in the context of a multi-factor design, 
why should we not examine only interaction effects, thus conditioning on the 
existence of the other fire, which we know to have been “on”? 
To explain the intuition behind this approach, and, in particular, behind 
examining the main effect of each fire, I would ask the reader to consider the 
effect of Fire A on the destruction of the lodge, and to take a moment to 
articulate why the traditional but-for analysis (i.e., conditioning on Fire B) 
leads to an incorrect conclusion—that is, to articulate why it is intuitively 
incorrect to conclude that Fire A is not a cause of the lodge’s destruction. 
Many people, including myself, would explain that this conclusion is 
counter to our intuition, as well as court decisions, because it is known that, 
had Fire B not occurred, Fire A would have independently caused the 
destruction of the lodge (and, had Fire A not occurred, Fire B would have 
independently caused the destruction of the lodge). Therefore, the reasoning 
goes, it is illogical to conclude that neither fire is a cause of the outcome 
simply because the fires occurred simultaneously. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
has stated in a distinct but closely related context, “it would be nonsensical 
 
101. See generally Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876 (Cal. 1991) (“It has generally 
been recognized that the ‘but for’ test . . . should not be used when two ‘causes concur to bring 
about an event and either one of them operating alone could have been sufficient to cause the 
result . . . . The proper rule for such situations is that the defendant’s conduct is a cause of the 
event because it is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.’” (quoting 
Vecchione v. Carlin, 168 Cal. Rptr. 571, 576 (Ct. App. 1980))); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 
322. 
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to adopt a rule whereby individuals hurt by the combined wrongful acts of 
many . . . would have no redress, whereas individuals hurt by the acts of one 
person alone would have a remedy.”102 Thus, we reason that, because either 
fire would have destroyed the lodge independently, both fires are causes of 
the lodge’s destruction. 
But this logic is precisely the reasoning used in our main-effects analysis. 
By examining, for example, the main effect of Fire A in the potential 
outcomes framework, we ask not only what the outcome would be had Fire 
A not occurred but what the outcome would be had Fire B not occurred. 
Intuitively, we (and the courts) conclude that Fire A is a cause, because, had 
Fire B not occurred, Fire A would have destroyed the lodge. In our main-
effects analysis, we conclude similarly: Fire A would have destroyed the 
lodge had Fire A been “on” and Fire B been “off,” thus affecting the 
proportion of combinations of Fire A and Fire B for which the lodge is 
destroyed when Fire A is “on” versus “off,” thereby leading to the conclusion 
that Fire A is a cause of the lodge’s destruction. 
The point is this: In considering whether Fire A constitutes a cause of the 
lodge’s destruction, our common perception of what constitutes a cause is 
based not only on a comparison of counterfactuals associated with Fire A, but 
also on a comparison of counterfactuals associated with Fire B. Fundamental 
to our reasoning for why Fire A constitutes a cause is the question, what 
would have happened had Fire B not occurred? Accordingly, to examine both 
sets of counterfactuals, we examine the main effect of Fire A. Furthermore, 
this analysis is perfectly consistent with the counterfactual model of 
causation. It simply broadens the causation inquiry to account for the 
complexity of a multi-factor problem, pursuant to the potential outcomes 
framework. 
C. Does the Factorial Approach Change the Meaning of 
Counterfactual Causation? 
A possible response to my analysis is that the factorial approach permits 
the intuitive result only by changing the meaning of counterfactual 
causation—in particular, by violating the “rule” of the counterfactual model 
that we consider the outcome in a hypothetical world in which we remove the 
condition, and only the condition, that is alleged to have caused the subject 
injury. This response, however, is grounded in an oversimplified 
understanding of the counterfactual model and but-for causation. 
 
102. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 452 (2014). 
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As discussed supra, factual causation is intended to reflect actual, or 
scientific, cause and effect. This is the underlying purpose of the 
counterfactual inquiry—to determine, as a matter of fact, whether a 
defendant’s wrongful act caused the plaintiff’s injury. The counterfactual 
model of causation is not a proxy for scientific cause and effect—it is the 
conceptual basis of scientific cause and effect, as represented by the potential 
outcomes framework. While most situations entail a straightforward 
application of the but-for standard, this standard is only a specific measure 
within the broader counterfactual framework. But it is this broader 
framework that the law seeks to capture in the factual-causation inquiry; and 
the same principles from this broader framework that underlie the but-for 
standard in single-factor problems extend to establish main-effects estimands 
in multi-factor problems. These estimands are consistent with both common 
sense and scientific cause and effect under the counterfactual model. 
It is incorrect to say that the above analysis violates the “rules” of the 
counterfactual model of cause and effect. Further, because this is the case, 
and because the law intends a model of causation that reflects scientific cause 
and effect, it is also incorrect to say that the main-effects analysis above is 
invalid on the grounds that it changes the “rules” of counterfactual causation. 
D. Extending the Analysis to Successive Multiple Sufficient Causes 
Treating both fires as interventions and examining both interaction effects 
and main effects allows a more comprehensive understanding of the effects 
of each fire on the destruction of the lodge. Applying the factorial approach, 
each fire in the concurrent two-fire problem can be understood as a cause of 
the lodge’s destruction. Similar reasoning applies to the first fire in the 
successive two-fire problem. 
Imagine that Fire A and Fire B arrived at the site of the lodge from slightly 
different directions, and that Fire A arrived prior to Fire B, thus preempting 
the ability of Fire B to destroy the lodge. We are interested in knowing the 
effect of Fire A on the destruction of the lodge. To analyze the problem, we 
can simply examine the effect of Fire A as we did in the concurrent two-fire 
problem. Doing so similarly results in a positive main effect of Fire A on the 
lodge’s destruction and an interaction effect of zero. Alternatively, we can 
use variations of this approach to incorporate explicitly the time element 
featured in the successive two-fire problem—although traditional 
formulations of the but-for approach to this problem (i.e., conditioning on the 
914 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
occurrence of Fire B) often do not do so.103 In any event, a main-effects 
analysis generally leads to the conclusion that Fire A is a cause of the lodge’s 
destruction. 
Applying a factorial analysis to the successive two-fire problem is 
relatively straightforward for analyzing the main and interaction effects of 
Fire A. However, defining the main effects of Fire B in the successive two-
fire problem is somewhat more complex. In particular, although we know 
from the successive two-fire scenario that Fire B arrives only after Fire A has 
already destroyed the lodge, examining the main effect of Fire B could lead 
to the conclusion that Fire B has a positive effect on the lodge’s destruction—
a misleading result, given that a fire cannot cause the destruction of a lodge 
that has already been destroyed.104 This conclusion is, however, avoided if 
the problem is structured carefully using a “sequential” design that accounts 
for the successive nature of the fires in the successive two-fire problem.105 
In a multi-treatment experiment, a sequential design allows the 
examination of multiple treatments that occur in succession rather than 
concurrently—exactly the scenario in the successive two-fire problem.106 
This is a developing area of causal inference, but valid and well-defined 
within the potential outcomes framework. In a two-factor sequential 
experiment, the idea is to apply one treatment in period one, measuring the 
outcome variable at the end of period one; and then to apply the second 
treatment in period two, measuring the outcome variable at the end of period 
two while conditioning on the outcome of period one.107 Therefore, the causal 
effect would be defined as a contrast between the potential outcomes when 
Fire B is “on” and when Fire B is “off,” given the outcome of period 1, the 
destruction of the lodge. This leads to the calculation 1 – 1 = 0: the lodge at 
the end of period 2 is destroyed when Fire B is “on” and when Fire B is “off,” 
conditional on the lodge having been destroyed in period 1. This analysis 
leads to the intuitive result that Fire B has no causal effect on the destruction 
of the lodge in the successive two-fire problem. 
 
103. In particular, although the fact pattern in the successive two-fire problem involves 
successive fires, the literature applying the but-for test to this problem frequently does not 
incorporate the time element in any explicit way in its analysis. 
104. Under some theories of causation, it could be acceptable to define Fire B as a cause; but, 
consistent with the overwhelming consensus in the courts and literature, I assume that Fire B is 
understood as incapable of causing the destruction of a lodge that has previously been destroyed 
by Fire A. 
105. See generally Iavor Bojinov & Neil Shephard, Time Series Experiments and Causal 
Estimands: Exact Randomization Tests and Trading, J. AM. STAT. ASS’N (forthcoming 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.2018.1527225 [https://perma.cc/LV2X-6HSR]. 
106. See id. at 1–5. 
107. See id. 
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Perhaps more simply, care needs to be taken in specifying treatments and 
causal effects, the definitions of which include a time element. Defining an 
appropriate estimand generally requires an ordering in which a treatment 
occurs prior to an outcome. In the following Part, I argue that the factorial 
approach can be applied in practice by specifying an estimand based on the 
causal-set approach of the NESS test and the Restatement Third. Under the 
NESS test, “a condition contributed to some consequence if and only if it was 
necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that 
was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.”108 It thus requires that 
the tortious act be “a necessary element of the set of actual antecedent 
conditions that was sufficient for the injury,” a “necessary condition” of 
which is “that the injury not have occurred already as a result of other actual 
conditions outside the set.”109 
The issue of successive multiple sufficient causes again highlights a 
general theme of this article: The potential outcomes model provides a 
coherent framework for analyzing causal questions; but the researcher (or the 
court) is responsible for defining estimands that are appropriate under the 
circumstances of a case. The time element in the successive two-fire problem 
provides a good example: oversimplification can lead to a misleading result. 
More generally, the flexibility enabled by the potential outcomes 
framework could arguably lead to a degree of uncertainty. But the capacity 
of the potential outcomes framework to integrate different estimands should 
not be viewed as a weakness. Indeed, it is widely understood as an important 
feature of the framework. The law should, however, be clear regarding the 
meaning of relevant estimands and, for example, the circumstances under 
which a multi-treatment analysis is appropriate.  
V. IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Counterfactual Model as a General Theory of Causation 
The purported inability to “reduce[] [causation] to a single concept” has 
caused substantial problems in various areas of the law.110 As discussed in 
Part II, courts and scholars have treated cases involving multiple sufficient 
causes as requiring an exception to the counterfactual model of causation. 
This purported failure of the counterfactual model has produced considerable 
 
108. Wright, Grounds and Extent, supra note 32, at 1441; Wright, Once More into the 
Bramble Bush, supra note 32, at 1102–03; see also Wright, supra note 6, at 1788–1803.  
109. Wright, supra note 6, at 1794–95 (emphasis added). 
110. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 48, at 228. 
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opposition to the model and calls to altogether abandon it as a theory of 
causation. My results in Part IV show, however, that these efforts, and even 
efforts to abandon the but-for measure of causation in particular, are built on 
faulty ground. 
As explained above, the problem arises from an oversimplified 
understanding of the counterfactual model and but-for causation. Although 
for most causation inquiries, the results that would emerge from a narrow and 
simple understanding of this model are consistent with our intuition and a 
broader understanding based on scientific cause and effect, courts and 
scholars have frequently rejected the counterfactual model based on an 
oversimplified application of it to the exceptional and complex circumstances 
of concurrent and successive multiple sufficient causes. These circumstances, 
however, require additional nuance, as evidenced by scientific methods for 
addressing multiple factors based on the counterfactual model.   
Predominant methods for proving cause and effect in the hard and social 
sciences are based on the potential outcomes framework. This framework, 
which has been applied in legal contexts to prove statistical cause and effect, 
also allows for a careful and rigorous application of the counterfactual model 
of causation in cases involving multiple sufficient causes. Following the 
potential outcomes framework strengthens the causation standard by melding 
it with scientific standards of cause and effect and making it consistent with 
standards applied to statistical evidence offered to prove factual causation. 
Furthermore, however, it strengthens the law’s notion of causation 
conceptually, allowing application in a way that maintains its simplicity and 
intuitive results in simple cases, while providing a well-established and 
robust framework for analyzing more complex cases that is consistent with 
both our intuition and scientific cause and effect. 
The factorial approach to multiple sufficient causes examines the effects 
of hypothesized causes as “treatments” in a multi-treatment, or factorial, 
setting within the potential outcomes framework. Applying this approach, 
and a main-effects analysis in particular (see Part IV), to the two-fire 
problems leads to the conclusion that each fire in the concurrent two-fire 
problem and the first fire in the successive two-fire problem can and should 
be understood, consistent with intuition and court decisions, as causes of the 
lodge’s destruction in those problems. Indeed, it leads to acceptable results 
more generally, because it permits a logical method for analyzing causal 
problems. 
This conclusion is consistent not only with intuition, but with the 
predominant scientific conception of cause and effect based on the 
counterfactual model. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the counterfactual 
model fails as applied to cases involving multiple sufficient causes or that an 
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exception to the counterfactual model is needed in such cases. Moreover, it 
is incorrect to abandon the counterfactual model as a theory of causation on 
the grounds that it fails in these cases or that it is an incomplete account of 
what is meant by cause and effect based on multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations. To the contrary, one must only look to statistics and the sciences—
undoubtedly fundamental to our common conception, as well as tort law’s 
notion, of cause and effect—for appropriately defining factual causation in 
these circumstances. 
B. Counterfactual Causation Should be Used in Torts Cases Involving 
Multiple Sufficient Causes 
In the preceding section, I discuss descriptive implications of my results—
specifically, that it is incorrect to reject the counterfactual model of causation 
on grounds that it fails in multiple-sufficient-cause situations. In this section, 
I address the separate issue of how to analyze and decide cases involving 
multiple sufficient causes. I argue that my results disfavor the substantial-
factor test and that courts should instead apply a standard based on the 
factorial approach, which, I show, can be simplified and applied in practice 
by using the causal-set approach of the NESS test and the Restatement Third. 
Indeed, the causal-set approach can be understood as an application of the 
counterfactual model within the meaning of scientific cause and effect. 
Tort law seeks a factual causal inquiry that generates outcomes that reflect 
actual, or scientific, cause and effect. Fundamental to this aim is a standard 
of factual causation that 1) reflects actual cause and effect and 2) permits a 
principled approach to determining whether the standard has been satisfied. 
The counterfactual model, and the factorial approach in particular, fulfills 
both of these criteria; the substantial-factor test satisfies neither. Additionally, 
applying the causal-set approach in the NESS test and the Restatement Third 
would allow courts to apply a simple standard that is consistent with and 
supported by the factorial approach. 
1. Rejecting the substantial-factor test in favor of the factorial 
approach.  
The factorial approach reflects the scientific notion of cause and effect and 
a proper application of the counterfactual model to cases involving multiple 
sufficient causes. This is not the case with the substantial-factor test. The 
918 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
substantial-factor test—the most common alternative to the but-for test111—
has no analytical connection to the meaning of actual, or scientific, cause and 
effect. Relatedly, as commentators and courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have highlighted, the substantial-factor test lacks a well-defined meaning in 
the first instance, giving rise to unpredictability and outcomes that derive 
from the whims of factfinders rather than a principled analysis.112 
It is not even clear how the substantial-factor test would be integrated with 
predominant conceptions of cause and effect. For example, an analysis of 
whether an event constitutes a substantial factor would begin by defining an 
outcome variable and an event that is hypothesized to have impacted the 
outcome variable. If the outcome variable is binary, such as whether a lodge 
was destroyed or not or whether a person died or not, then the substantial-
factor test seems to ask whether the event “contributed” to the outcome. But 
what does it mean to “contribute” to an outcome? Perhaps it means that some 
percentage value can be ascribed to the event in producing the outcome. But 
this notion is ill defined and quickly crumbles unless it is transformed to a 
more complex version of the counterfactual model of cause and effect. It is 
possible, for example, to formulate an effect in terms of a percentage value 
by using 1) the simple but-for test, but where the outcome variable is defined 
as the percentage change in the likelihood of a binary event occurring rather 
than a binary outcome variable; or 2) the factorial approach’s main-effects 
analysis, which, like the but-for test, relies on the counterfactual model, but 
which employs an outcome variable that can be defined in terms of 
percentage values based on a comparison of potential outcomes associated 
with combinations of hypothesized causes. But, if the substantial-factor test 
is intended to refer to either of these notions, then let courts define it 
rigorously as such. The problem is that the substantial-factor test does not 
refer to either of these concepts; rather, it refers to a nebulous idea that 
converts the factual-cause inquiry to a standardless determination that reflects 
nothing but a vague sense of attributing responsibility for an outcome to some 
 
111. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997) (“California 
has definitively adopted the substantial factor test . . . . which subsumes the ‘but for’ test while 
reaching beyond it to satisfactorily address other situations, such as those involving independent 
or concurrent causes in fact.”). 
112. See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 217 (2014) (commenting that the 
prosecution’s proposed use of a substantial-factor test “cannot be reconciled with sound policy, 
given the need for clarity and certainty in the criminal law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1214 (“The term ‘substantial factor’ has not been judicially defined with 
specificity, and indeed it has been observed that it is ‘neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to 
any lower terms’” (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 267); Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 
736 S.E.2d 724, 730 (Va. 2013) (“In sum, some jurors might construe the term to lower the 
threshold of proof required for causation while others might interpret it to mean the opposite. We 
do not believe that substantial contributing factor has a single, common-sense meaning . . . .”).  
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event. Consequently, courts employing this standard leave the liability 
determination to a jury’s intuitive sense of responsibility rather than a 
principled factual inquiry, resulting in a high degree of randomness and bias 
through variables that would not be relevant to a factual inquiry regarding 
cause and effect.113 
The factorial approach is more principled. In the two-fire scenario, a 
factfinder could complete the 2x2 table containing outcomes associated with 
combinations of Fire A = on, Fire A = off, Fire B = on, and Fire B = off, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 Fire A = off Fire A = on 
Fire B = off ? ? 
Fire B = on ? ? 
Figure 2. The factorial approach requires completing the 2x2 
table containing potential outcomes associated with 
combinations of Fire A and Fire B. 
 
A multiple-sufficient-cause situation arises from findings of fact 
consistent with those in the 2x2 table in Figure 3. Under these circumstances, 
Fire A and Fire B can be understood as causes based on a main-effects 
analysis reflecting these findings—for example, based on the fact that Fire A 
would destroy the lodge in a greater proportion of treatment combinations 
when Fire A is on than when Fire A is off; and Fire B would destroy the lodge 
in a greater proportion of treatment combinations when Fire B is on than 
when Fire B is off. Using this approach, to determine whether Fire A is a 
cause of the lodge’s destruction, a factfinder would complete the table and 
answer the question: “What is the impact of Fire A being on versus off on the 
proportion of combinations for which the lodge is destroyed?”  
 
113. “[T]he development of several quite distinct and conflicting meanings for the term 
‘substantial factor’ has created risk of confusion and misunderstanding, especially when a court, 
or an advocate or scholar, uses the phrase without explicit indication of which of its conflicting 
meanings is intended.” Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 884 (Cal. 1991) (Kennard, J., 
dissenting) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, 1988 supp., § 41, at 43) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk 
Contribution Model, 25 ENVTL. L. REV. 549, 631 (1995) (describing the substantial-factor test as 
one that “has become a default, resorted to when nothing else works” and for which “juries are 
afforded virtually no guidance as to how much of a causal connection is necessary to satisfy the 
test”). 
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The factorial approach is thus relatively simple and applies generally to 
multiple-sufficient-cause situations, including more complex problems such 
as those involving more than two factors. I discuss such problems and 
implications of the factorial approach for the causal-set model in the 
following subsection. 
 
Multiple Sufficient Causes 
 Fire A = off Fire A = on 
Fire B = off Not Destroyed Destroyed 
Fire B = on Destroyed Destroyed 
Figure 3. 2x2 table illustrating potential outcomes in a 
multiple-sufficient-cause situation. 
2. The causal-set approach.   
The factorial approach is a rigorous method, based on the counterfactual 
model, for analyzing actual cause and effect. Using certain modest 
assumptions, it can generally be applied in practice—with similar logic and 
results—by using the causal-set approach of the NESS test and the 
Restatement Third. Let us compare the Restatement Third approach to the 
factorial approach in the concurrent two-fire problem.   
Section 27 of the Restatement Third states: “If multiple acts occur, each 
of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the physical 
harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded 
as a factual cause of the harm.”114 This standard requires the same findings of 
fact as those required in the factorial approach and as illustrated in the 2x2 
matrices in Figures 2 and 3. Section 27 implicitly requires that the occurrence 
of both Fires together is associated with the destruction of the lodge (lower 
right quadrant in Figure 3) and explicitly requires that 1) the occurrence of 
Fire A alone is associated with the destruction of the lodge (upper right 
quadrant of Figure 3), 2) the occurrence of Fire B alone is associated with the 
destruction of the lodge (lower left quadrant of Figure 3), and 3) the non-
occurrence of Fire A and Fire B is associated with the non-destruction of the 
lodge (upper left quadrant of Figure 3). Therefore, making certain modest 
assumptions regarding the estimand to be applied in the factorial approach, 
the Restatement Third standard (as well as the NESS test, a version of which 
 
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010). 
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is incorporated in the Restatement Third approach) applies the same basic 
algorithm and produces the same results as does the factorial approach in the 
concurrent two-fire scenario and analogous problems: both methods 
complete the matrix in Figure 2 and both result in the finding that Fire A and 
Fire B are causes if the findings of fact lead to the pattern in Figure 3.115  
Thus, the factorial approach can be understood as supporting—and 
specifically, as providing a scientific foundation for—the causal-set approach 
in the Restatement Third (and the NESS test). This foundation could replace 
an outcome-oriented understanding of the Restatement Third approach—one, 
for example, that views this approach as “a legal principle to govern the 
outcome” directly and to “declare[]” acts as factual causes where the but-for 
test, a test based on the actual or scientific meaning of cause and effect, fails 
and “further assistance” is needed.116 
Let us now compare the NESS test and the factorial approach in situations 
involving more than two factors.117 Imagine an action involving allegations 
that five polluters caused a certain type of pollution to rise to dangerous 
levels, causing injury.118 Employing the factorial approach, computing the 
factorial main effects of Polluter A in particular would involve a comparison 
between the potential outcomes associated with Pollutant A = on and the 
potential outcomes associated with Pollutant A = off, aggregating over the 
various combinations of the occurrence and non-occurrence of the other 
pollutants. Using the basic notation of Part II, the problem would involve a 
comparison between 1) the potential outcomes Y1(Da=1,Db,Dc,Dd,De), 
Y2(Da=1,Db,Dc,Dd,De), . . ., Ym(Da=1,Db,Dc,Dd,De), where Da, . . ., De 
represent indicators for whether each of the five factors are on or off, Da=1 
indicates that Pollutant A = on, and subscripts 1, . . ., m index the particular 
treatment combination of Da=1, . . ., De with which each potential outcome 
is associated, and 2) the potential outcomes Ym+1(Da=0,Db,Dc,Dd,De), 
Ym+2(Da=0,Db,Dc,Dd,De), . . ., Yn(Da=0,Db,Dc,Dd,De), where Da=0 indicates 
that Pollutant A = off and subscripts m+1, . . ., n index the particular treatment 
 
115. The causal-set approach, like the traditional but-for measure of causation, exists within 
the potential outcomes framework—it defines certain measures within the broader counterfactual 
model. 
116. State v. Tribble, 790 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Iowa 2010) (emphasis added). 
117. See, e.g., Major v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 581 (Ct. App. 
2017) (involving multiple tobacco producers and asbestos manufacturers; “the issue raised . . . is 
how to deal with a case of more than two concurrent causes, when various combinations of the 
causes—although perhaps not any individual cause—would have been sufficient to cause the 
harm”). 
118. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 27 cmt. f, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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combination of Da=0, . . ., De with which each potential outcome is 
associated. 
In essence, the factorial main-effects inquiry asks whether dangerous 
levels of pollution occur for a higher proportion of treatment combinations in 
which Pollutant A = on than treatment combinations in which Pollutant A = 
off. Frequently—and specifically, when the number of treatment 
combinations in the two categories are equal—this is equivalent to the 
question whether dangerous levels of pollution occur more frequently when 
Pollutant A = on or Pollutant A = off. However, to avoid considering all of 
the treatment combinations in each category, we can simply ask whether, for 
a particular treatment combination, Pollutant A would mean the difference 
between dangerous levels of pollution and non-dangerous levels of pollution. 
For example, if the potential outcomes associated with two treatment 
combinations, the only difference between which is that Pollutant A is on 
versus off, are different—and specifically, reaching the pollution threshold 
for Pollutant A = on and not reaching it for Pollutant A = off—then, holding 
all else equal, this can be interpreted as a causal effect of Pollutant A in a 
main-effects analysis. Notationally, if Yi(1,db,dc,dd,de) – Yj(0,db,dc,dd,de) = 1 
(otherwise stated, if Yi(1,db,dc,dd,de) = 1 and Yj(0,db,dc,dd,de) = 0), where 
lowercase da, . . ., de are used to represent particular values of Da, . . ., De, 
respectively, and i and j represent particular treatment combinations, then, 
putting aside other possible differences in pairs of treatment combinations 
when Pollutant A = on versus Pollutant A = off, Pollutant A can be said to 
have a factorial main effect on reaching dangerous levels of pollution.119 
Significantly, however, this simplified formulation of the factorial 
main-effects approach constitutes a form of the causal-set approach of the 
NESS test, which could provide a straightforward prescription for courts to 
apply in cases involving multiple hypothesized causes. The NESS test asks 
whether Pollutant A is a necessary element of a sufficient set—that is, 
whether it is necessary to the sufficiency of a set in producing a dangerous 
level of pollution. In the language of the potential outcomes framework, this 
test can be formulated as asking whether there is a pair of treatment 
combinations, the only difference between which is that one involves 
Pollutant A = on and the other involves Pollutant A = off, for which the 
potential outcome associated with Pollutant A = on is 1 (i.e., reaching the 
pollution threshold) and the potential outcome associated with Pollutant A = 
off is 0 (i.e., not reaching the pollution threshold). Notationally, this 
formulation asks whether there is a pair of potential outcomes such that 
 
119. This logic in fact relies on the reasonable assumption that the emission of Pollutant A 
can add to the pollution and to the possibility of reaching the threshold but cannot diminish the 
pollution or the possibility of reaching the threshold. 
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Yi(1,db,dc,dd,de) – Yj(0,db,dc,dd,de) = 1. This is the same question that is asked 
above in the context of the simplified factorial main-effects analysis. 
To be sure, there are important differences between the NESS test and the 
potential outcomes framework, and the factorial approach in particular. 
Nevertheless, the logic and the results of the NESS test will frequently mirror 
those of the factorial approach. The same can be said of the Restatement 
Third approach.120 
Therefore, as in the two-fire problem, in addition to providing a rigorous 
framework for addressing multiple sufficient causes using the counterfactual 
model, the factorial approach supports the causal-set model of the NESS test 
and the Restatement Third by providing a rigorous scientific and statistical 
foundation for them, and, further, by establishing their fundamental 
connection to the counterfactual model of cause and effect. 
C. Implications Beyond Tort Law 
Many areas of the law look to tort law to decide cases involving multiple 
sufficient causes and complex causation issues in general. This is, in part, due 
to the extensive analysis afforded these issues in tort law, as well as the close 
analogy between these issues in torts cases and other areas of the law.121 Such 
areas include criminal law, contracts, employment discrimination, and 
antitrust law, to name a few. For example, in the criminal case Burrage v. 
United States, the Supreme Court relied on tort law to determine whether a 
defendant’s distribution of heroin constituted a cause of a drug user’s death, 
where the drug user died following a binge that included the heroin but that 
may have been sufficient to kill the drug user even without the heroin.122 In 
the employment-discrimination context, the Supreme Court has held that “in 
 
120. Philosophic components underlying NESS overlap substantially with those underlying 
the potential outcomes framework. The meaning of cause and effect in the potential outcomes 
framework, or the Rubin Causal Model, is in various respects consistent with the philosophic 
notions of cause and effect of Hume and Mill. Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 
81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 951 (1986). As statistician Paul Holland concluded, “Mill’s thinking, 
being driven by an experimental model, is in reasonably close agreement with the [Rubin Causal 
Model].” Id. At the same time, the NESS test “incorporates the traditional Humean philosophic 
account of the meaning of causation, as modified by John Stuart Mill.” Wright, supra note 6, at 
1774. 
121. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) (“The requisite 
relation between prohibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the principles of 
causation, a subject most often arising in elaborating the law of torts.”). 
122. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–17 (2014); see also Paroline v. United 
States, 572 U.S. 434, 452 (2014); State v. Tribble, 790 N.W.2d 121, 126–27 (Iowa 2010) (relying 
on tort law in felony-murder case to define causation generally and in multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations). 
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enacting Title VII,” Congress “is presumed to have incorporated” the cause-
in-fact standard of tort law “absent an indication to the contrary in the statute 
itself.”123 And, in antitrust law, courts frequently refer to tort law in resolving 
complex causation issues.124 
In these contexts, and in others, the meaning of causation and the operation 
of the counterfactual model are tightly connected to those in tort law, either 
directly—because the law in these substantive areas relies on tort law—or at 
least by analogy. As such, the implications for tort law discussed supra 
generally extend to issues of causation, and of multiple sufficient causes in 
particular, in these substantive areas.  
Consider, for example, a circumstance in contract law that can give rise to 
multiple-sufficient-cause issues analogous to those in tort law: In California 
& Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., a plaintiff agriculture cooperative 
contracted with two companies for the production of an “integrated tug 
barge” (one company for the construction of a barge and the second company 
for the delivery of the tug) to transport raw sugar by sea from Hawaii to 
California.125 Both companies breached their respective contracts by 
delivering on them late, causing substantial injury.126 The Ninth Circuit held 
that “in this case of concurrent causation each defaulting contractor is liable 
for the breach and for the substantial damages which the joint breach 
occasions.”127 Applying a form of the substantial-factor test, the court held 
that the defendant was “a substantial cause of the damages flowing from the 
lack of the integrated tug; [it] cannot be absolved by the absence of the tug.”128  
My conclusions above apply: rather than resigning simply to intuition and 
applying the nebulous substantial-factor test based on the purported failure 
of the counterfactual model in this scenario, the factorial approach may allow 
 
123. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 346–47; see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (“This 
Court has noted that an action brought for compensation by a victim of housing discrimination is, 
in effect, a tort action. . . . And the Court has assumed that, when Congress creates a tort action, 
it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and 
consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.”). 
124. See, e.g., Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 415 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(remarking, in case brought under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, that case does not involve 
circumstances in which “an injurious event is ‘overdetermined’ by multiple sufficient causes,” 
citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010)); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 708–09 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(commenting that a particular antitrust doctrine is simply “the application to antitrust law of 
venerable principles of tort causation”); Valley Prods. Co. v. Landmark, 877 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 
(W.D. Tenn. 1994) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court recognized a substantive causation element in 
antitrust claims, analogous to the notion of proximate cause in tort actions.”). 
 125. 794 F.2d 1433, 1434–35 (9th Cir. 1986). 
126. Id. at 1435. 
127. Id. at 1437. 
128. Id. at 1437–38. 
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a rigorous test that follows the counterfactual model. More generally, the 
factorial approach would facilitate a better standard for addressing multiple-
sufficient-cause situations in a wide range of legal contexts that directly 
follow or are analogous to these situations and accompanying law in torts 
cases. 
D. The “Ordinary Meaning” of Causal Language 
Another general context for which the analysis in Part IV has important 
implications involves the common situation in which a case turns on judicial 
interpretation of the “ordinary meaning” of causal language in a statute, such 
as “results from,” “because of,” or “based on.” When a statute does not 
specify the meaning of a phrase, courts interpret it using the phrase’s 
“ordinary meaning.”129 The Supreme Court has held that phrases such as 
“results from,” “because of,” and “based on” are “ordinarily” defined as 
but-for causation.130 In Burrage, for example, the Court interpreted the 
Controlled Substances Act to determine whether a drug user’s death 
“following an extended drug binge” that involved, among other drugs, heroin 
purchased from the defendant fell within the Act’s language imposing a 
minimum sentence if the death “resulted from” the defendant’s unlawful 
distribution.131 According to the Court: 
The Controlled Substances Act does not define the phrase “results 
from,” so we give it its ordinary meaning. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. 
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187, 115 S.Ct. 788, 130 L.Ed.2d 682 
(1995). A thing “results” when it “[a]rise[s] as an effect, issue, or 
outcome from some action, process or design.” 2 The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary 2570 (1993). “Results from” imposes, 
in other words, a requirement of actual causality. “In the usual 
course,” this requires proof “‘that the harm would not have 
occurred’ in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s 
conduct.” University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar, 570 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2525, 186 L.Ed.2d 
503 (2013) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 431, 
Comment a (1934)).132 
The Court held that “[t]his but-for requirement is part of the common 
understanding of cause,” and noted that “courts regularly read phrases like 
 
129. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014). 
130. Id. at 210–14. 
 131. Id. at 206–07. 
132. Id. at 210–11. 
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‘results from’ to require but-for causality.”133 In Burrage, the Court relied on 
this ordinary meaning of “results from” to hold that the prosecution did not 
satisfy the causation element of its claim. The Court rejected the 
prosecution’s proposed “less demanding” “substantial” or “contributing” 
factor test as harmful to goals of “clarity and certainty in the criminal law.”134 
It held, however, that it was not necessary to decide on how the statute’s 
language would apply to multiple-sufficient-cause situations, since there was 
no evidence that the distributed heroin “was an independently sufficient cause 
of [the decedent’s] death.”135 
Although the Court expressly declined to indicate how its analysis would 
apply to multiple-sufficient-cause situations, its discussion highlights certain 
complexities that would arise in these circumstances, including the Court’s 
reluctance to apply a substantial-factor test and its interest in adhering to the 
ordinary meaning of the statute’s “results from” language. In these 
circumstances, the Court’s analysis could arguably benefit from the factorial 
approach, which would provide the Court with an avenue to adhere to the 
ordinary meaning of the statute’s language (and policy reasoning suggested 
in Burrage) by applying the counterfactual model of causation and avoiding 
a vague substantial-factor test, while at the same time allowing the Court to 
uphold the outcome in multiple-sufficient-cause situations that courts have 
near-universally determined (and that statutes such as the Controlled 
Substances Act may intend)—that a concurrent sufficient cause constitutes a 
“cause.”   
In particular, the Court could determine that, in light of the meaning of 
scientific cause and effect as represented by the potential outcomes 
framework, the “ordinary” meaning of causation is broader than the 
traditionally narrow understanding of but-for causation and, rather, entails the 
broader counterfactual model and the possibility of measures based on main 
effects as well as interaction effects. This interpretation is consistent with 
both approaches discussed in section III.B—broadening the scope of but-for 
causation to incorporate principles from the broader counterfactual model or 
looking directly to the broader counterfactual model for the meaning of 
causation in multiple-sufficient-cause situations. Further, this interpretation 
is supported by the argument in section III.B that the “ordinary” meaning of 
causation, as reflected in standard dictionary entries for “causation” (and 
similar terms), is very closely related to, if not the same as, the scientific 
meaning of cause and effect. 
 
133. Id. at 211–12. 
134. Id. at 215, 217. 
135. Id. at 214–15. 
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E. Implications for “Mixed-Motive” Employment Discrimination Cases 
Finally, my analysis carries important implications for the employment 
discrimination context, and mixed-motive situations in particular. This 
category of applications can perhaps be understood as a subset of those 
discussed in the previous two sections; but the problems that arise from this 
context are sufficiently unique and important to merit an independent 
discussion. 
A mixed-motive case is a type of employment discrimination case that 
involves an “employment decision attributable to . . . both legitimate and 
illegitimate factors.”136 These cases arise frequently and have caused 
substantial inconsistency and confusion in employment discrimination law. 
This is not surprising: Although often not recognized as such, many 
mixed-motive situations constitute a specific type of multiple-sufficient-
cause situation.137 This is because, generally, these cases involve a situation 
in which two (or more) independent factors produce an outcome—an adverse 
employment action—where each alone would be sufficient to produce this 
outcome. 
The Supreme Court case University of Texas Southwestern Medical 
Center v. Nassar involved a Title VII retaliation claim (among other claims) 
asserting that University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center retaliated 
against an employee physician, resulting in his firing, after he accused his 
superior of discrimination based on race and religion.138 The Fifth Circuit 
upheld the retaliation claim based on the theory that these claims “require 
only a showing that retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse 
employment action, rather than its but-for cause,” and its holding that “the 
evidence supported a finding that [the adverse employment action] was 
motivated, at least in part, to retaliate against respondent for his complaints 
against [his superior].”139 
 
136. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 370 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
137. See generally Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence, 86 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 725, 728, 741–62 (2019) (arguing against application of the but-for standard in 
mixed-motive cases, concluding that “widespread acceptance of the But-For standard represents 
a great failure of the jurisprudence of mixed motives,” id. at 728, and that “many motive inquiries 
are not causal,” id. at 742, and, even “[i]f we analogize a defendant’s motives as potential causes 
of the action, then mixed motives are analogous to torts with multiple causes,” id. at 755; 
highlighting that “an item failing the but-for test can still [in tort law and in general] be a cause,” 
such as in cases involving multiple sufficient causes, id. at 754–55). 
138. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 344–45 (majority opinion). 
139. Id. at 345–46. 
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The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit. 
Expressly applying tort law, it held that the but-for standard applies to 
determine whether the causation element was fulfilled: 
It is thus textbook tort law that an action “is not regarded as a cause 
of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it.” 
This, then, is the background against which Congress legislated in 
enacting Title VII, and these are the default rules it is presumed to 
have incorporated, absent an indication to the contrary in the statute 
itself.140 
To provide some important background: In 1989, six justices of the 
Supreme Court agreed in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (although not in a 
majority opinion) that, to satisfy the causation element in the statutory 
language prohibiting discrimination against an individual “because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” a plaintiff need only 
“show that one of the prohibited traits was a ‘motivating’ or ‘substantial’ 
factor in the employer’s decision.”141 If this standard is satisfied,  
the burden of persuasion would shift to the employer, which could 
escape liability if it could prove that it would have taken the same 
employment action in the absence of all discriminatory animus. In 
other words, the employer had to show that a discriminatory motive 
was not the but-for cause of the adverse employment action.142 
Congress then passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which “codified the 
burden-shifting and lessened-causation framework of Price Waterhouse in 
part but also rejected it to a substantial degree.”143 Specifically, Congress 
amended Title VII to incorporate the requirement that a plaintiff show that 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice”;144 at the same time, Congress replaced the Court’s burden-shifting 
scheme with one in which a showing by the employer that it would have taken 
the same employment action even without the influence of the plaintiff’s trait 
would nevertheless permit the plaintiff to win “declaratory relief, attorney’s 
fees and costs, and some forms of injunctive relief,” but not “monetary 
damages [or] a reinstatement order.”145 
 
140. Id. at 347 (citation omitted) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 265). 
141. Id. at 348 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
142. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258, 259–60, 276–77). 
143. Id. 
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). 
145. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 349. 
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The Court again addressed this issue in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 
Inc. in the context of a claim based on the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), a statute establishing liability for an employer for 
discrimination against an individual “because of such individual’s age.”146 In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that the ordinary meaning of the words 
“because of” is “by reason of: on account of,” and that the language, “because 
of . . . age” means “that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to 
act”—i.e., “that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse 
decision.”147 The Court rejected the argument that the Court’s interpretation 
of the statute is subject to the burden-shifting scheme established in Price 
Waterhouse for mixed-motive Title VII cases, “[n]oting that the ADEA must 
be read . . . the way Congress wrote it,” and citing “textual differences 
between Title VII and the ADEA” and “congressional choice not to add a 
provision like § 2000e-2(m) to the ADEA despite making numerous other 
changes to the latter statute in the 1991 Act.”148 
In Nassar, the Supreme Court addressed Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision in particular. The statute provides that it is unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate against an employee “because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or 
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”149 
The Court in Nassar, again focusing on the meaning of the term “because,” 
held that “[g]iven the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the 
text in this statute and the one in Gross, the proper conclusion here, as in 
Gross, is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to 
retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”150 
Currently, therefore, the law provides for one causation standard, the 
motivating-factor standard, for some forms of discrimination, such as 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin under 
Title VII, and a different causation standard for other forms of discrimination, 
such as discrimination based on age under the ADEA, as well as for 
retaliation under Title VII. 
Moreover, even more muddled is the law surrounding mixed-motive cases 
based on the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), a statute prohibiting 
 
146. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 349–50. 
147. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (quoting 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966)). 
148. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350–51 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
149. § 2000e-3(a). 
150. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352. 
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discrimination “on the basis of” disability.151 In this context, circuit courts are 
split, with some courts holding that the ADA’s causal language must be 
interpreted to require that a plaintiff’s disability be the sole cause of an 
adverse employment action, and other courts holding that a plaintiff’s 
disability need only be a motivating factor of the employer’s adverse 
employment action rather than the sole cause of it.152 In this area of 
employment discrimination law, as in others, there is confusion and 
uncertainty regarding the law within circuits as well as between them.153 
These contradictory, uncertain, and often vague standards governing 
mixed-motive claims grounded in Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and other 
discrimination statutes are based on statutory interpretation. The Supreme 
Court and lower courts have, however, frequently taken for granted the 
meaning of causal language in these statutes, such as “because of” and “on 
the basis of.” In cases discussed above, the Supreme Court has concluded that 
the “ordinary meaning” of such language implies a but-for standard, and that 
applying a but-for standard to mixed-motive cases involving a sufficient 
legitimate motivating factor necessarily precludes the conclusion that the 
illegitimate motivating factor is a “cause” of the adverse employment action. 
However, based on the scientific meaning of cause and effect, as well as the 
close relationship between the scientific and “ordinary” meanings of cause 
and effect, the causal language in these statutes imply a counterfactual model 
of causation but not necessarily a but-for standard. And, to the extent that 
such language can be said to imply a but-for standard, that standard can be 
interpreted as capturing main effects as well as interaction effects in the 
context of multiple-sufficient-cause situations, including mixed-motive 
cases.  
 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
152. Compare, e.g., Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 105, 107–08 (2d Cir. 
2001) (reiterating an earlier ruling that “a plaintiff could succeed on his ADA claim where his 
disability played a motivating role in the decision, even if another factor . . . also played a 
substantial role” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), with Serwatka v. Rockwell 
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961–64 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Gross and holding that “given the 
lack of a provision in the ADA recognizing mixed-motive claims, such claims do not entitle a 
plaintiff to relief for disability discrimination”), and Gulliford v. Schilli Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 
4:15-CV-19-PRC, 2017 WL 1547301, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2017) (noting the 2008 
amendments to the ADA changing the “because of” language relied on in Serwatka to “on the 
basis of,” but following the decision in Serwatka based on the finding “that there is no meaningful 
textual difference between ‘on the basis of’ and the term[] ‘because of’”). See also BARBARA T. 
LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 197–99 (5th ed. 2012) (discussing 
circuit split and citing cases). 
153. See Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., Dist. No. 524, 795 F.3d 698, 705–
06 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing tortuous history and present uncertainty surrounding law governing 
ADA claims based on mixed-motive theories). 
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Whether the but-for standard is interpreted narrowly or broadly is largely 
semantic. Either way, the substantive point remains the same: the ordinary 
meaning of causal language such as “because of” and “on the basis of” should 
be understood as capturing the broader counterfactual model and the 
possibility of causal measures based on main effects as well as interaction 
effects. In a single-factor situation, this meaning simplifies to the traditional 
narrow but-for standard. But, in multiple-sufficient-cause situations, the 
scientific and common meaning of causation entails a broader range of 
possibilities; and, furthermore, as suggested by the discussion in Part IV, 
there are good arguments for employing a standard of causation that reflects 
a main-effects analysis in particular.154 
Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the causal language in Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the ADA does not necessitate the conclusion that Congress 
intended to exclude illegitimate underlying purposes from the scope of 
unlawful activity in mixed-motive cases. Rather, a factorial approach to these 
cases implies that a motivating factor could be a “cause,” even when there 
are other sufficient motivating factors. Furthermore, the Court’s conclusion 
in Gross and Nassar that causal language such as the term “because of” 
implies a but-for standard does not, based on the counterfactual model, 
necessitate the further conclusion that Congress intended to preclude mixed-
motive discrimination claims. Therefore, based on this reasoning, the Court 
could proceed to determine directly (rather than, e.g., through the term 
“because of”) whether Congress intended a causal relationship in the sense 
of main effects or interaction effects155—that is, whether Congress intended 
for an illegitimate motivating factor among sufficient legitimate motivating 
factors to constitute a cause. 
Without taking a position on whether Congress intended for such 
motivating factors to be captured by these statutes, I note that there are 
substantial arguments in favor of such a construction. For example, if a court 
cannot rely on the ordinary meaning of “because of” to exclude illegitimate 
motives in mixed-motive cases from unlawful behavior, precedent from torts 
and other areas of the law in which multiple sufficient causes are deemed 
“causes,” as well as other areas in the employment discrimination context, 
may play a more prominent role in interpreting congressional intent. 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the “motivating-factor” test 
is a particular form of the substantial-factor test described above. All of the 
criticisms that apply to the latter also apply to the former, including concerns 
 
154. As in section V.D, this argument is supported by the analysis in section III.B concluding 
that the “ordinary” meaning of causation correlates extremely well with, if it is not altogether 
equivalent to, the scientific meaning of cause and effect. 
155. See supra Part IV. 
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regarding the need for a clear standard of causation that is not simply left to 
the intuition of the factfinder.156 As explained above, the factorial approach 
offers a more rigorous and well-defined standard. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts should look to the fields of statistics and the sciences for guidance 
in developing a suitable theory of causation, as they very frequently do for 
evidence of causation. In particular, courts should adopt the potential 
outcomes framework for guidance in addressing causation inquiries in 
multiple-sufficient-cause situations. 
Currently, courts and scholars treat multiple-sufficient-cause situations as 
a single-factor problem in which counterfactuals associated with a single 
variable—for example, Fire A in the two-fire problem—are compared while 
holding all other features of the problem, including other “sufficient causes,” 
constant. But this is contrary to how courts, scholars, and people generally 
think about the problem. Rather, we interpret both fires in the two-fire 
problem as “treatments,” or as “factors” in a factorial experiment: we reason 
that Fire A is a cause of the lodge’s destruction because, had Fire B not 
existed, Fire A would have destroyed the lodge, whereas (still assuming that 
Fire B had not existed) the lodge would not have been destroyed had Fire A 
not existed. That is, intuitively, we treat Fire A and Fire B as treatments and 
consider not only counterfactuals associated with Fire A, but also 
counterfactuals associated with Fire B, as suggested by the italicized 
language above.  
Moreover, this reasoning is perfectly consistent with scientific cause and 
effect under the potential outcomes framework. That is, the counterfactual 
model itself does not require that we analyze causation as a single-factor 
problem. To the contrary, applying guidance from the potential outcomes 
 
156. Note that the issue of whether a court should apply a but-for standard or a substantial- 
or motivating- factor standard of causation in cases involving multiple sufficient causes, some 
legitimate and some illegitimate, arises in other contexts also. For example, in Mt. Healthy City 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, the Supreme Court, evaluating whether a school district’s refusal 
to renew the contract of a teacher violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, held that 
“[a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a part, 
‘substantial’ or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position 
as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had 
he done nothing”; and that, although “the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show 
that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ or 
to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the Board’s decision not to rehire 
him,” “the District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s 
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.” 429 U.S. 274, 285, 287 (1977). 
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framework, the problem could and should be examined as a multi-factor 
problem in which we consider two sets of counterfactuals, those associated 
with Fire A and those associated with Fire B. 
Treating a multiple-sufficient-cause situation rigidly as a single-factor 
problem—contrary to scientific treatment of analogous problems and indeed 
contrary to our intuitive interpretation of the situation—it is not surprising 
that we arrive at a counterintuitive result. 
Applying the potential outcomes framework, and the proposed factorial 
approach in particular, to cases involving multiple sufficient causes, we arrive 
at the intuitive result: both fires in the concurrent two-fire problem and the 
first fire in the successive two-fire problem should be understood as causes 
of the lodge’s destruction. 
This result carries important implications. First, courts and scholars have 
rejected the counterfactual theory of causation on grounds that it fails in 
circumstances involving multiple sufficient causes. But it does not; we have 
simply failed in applying it. Therefore, it is incorrect to apply this purported 
failure as the basis for a general move away from the counterfactual model. 
Moreover, courts have unjustifiably abandoned counterfactual causation in 
favor of the vague and intuition-based substantial-factor test in cases 
involving multiple sufficient causes. Courts have used the substantial-factor 
test as a policy tool, simply to replace a factual causal inquiry with an 
approach aimed at obtaining the sought-after outcome. But this approach has 
caused at least vast confusion and unpredictability, if not a range of other 
harms such as overdeterrence and damaging insurance rates. 
My analysis weighs in favor of rejecting the substantial-factor test and 
returning to a counterfactual approach, even for multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations. I have argued that a factorial approach to these situations can 
generally be simplified and applied in practice by using the causal-set 
approach of the NESS test and the Restatement Third, thus providing an 
explicit scientific basis for the causal-set approach. 
Furthermore, I have shown that my results extend, either directly or by 
analogy, well beyond tort law and have implications for a wide range of legal 
contexts in which multiple-sufficient-cause situations arise. These include, 
for example, criminal law, contracts, and employment discrimination. 
Additionally, because the “ordinary” meaning of causal statutory language 
such as “because of,” “results from,” and “on the basis of” coincides 
substantially with the scientific meaning of causal language, my results have 
implications for a wide range of claims involving the judicial interpretation 
of causal statutory language. These include constitutional claims, criminal 
claims, employment discrimination claims, and others. In particular, my 
analysis implies that such terms do not necessarily preclude liability or 
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unlawfulness in situations in which the alleged cause is accompanied by other 
sufficient causes. 
Finally, as a unique and important application of the foregoing 
implications, my results imply that, in mixed-motive employment 
discrimination cases (a specific category of multiple-sufficient-cause 
situations), the Supreme Court and lower courts should not take for granted 
that causal language in federal discrimination statutes indicates Congress’s 
intent to exclude from these statutes illegitimate motivating factors (such as 
race, gender, or age) that are accompanied by sufficient legitimate motivating 
factors. As I argue in Part V, confusion regarding legislative intent and the 
meaning of causal language in these statutes has led to vague and potentially 
inappropriate standards, and a general state of uncertainty in law governing 
mixed-motive employment discrimination claims. My analysis may help to 
address this confusion by applying the potential outcomes framework to 
inform the meaning of such language. This may help to unify a strict 
construction of causal statutory language on the one hand and intuition 
regarding the intent of Congress and the purpose of such statutes on the other. 
Before concluding, it is necessary to make two notes of caution. First, the 
factorial approach does not require a finding that factors in 
multiple-sufficient-cause situations constitute “causes.” For example, a court 
may find that, under certain circumstances, Congress intended an interaction-
effects analysis rather than a main-effects analysis—i.e., an analysis that 
conditions explicitly on other factors, such as legitimate motivating factors 
for an adverse employment action, rather than one that does not. The 
important point is that an interaction-effects analysis cannot be assumed. 
Indeed, as I argue in Part IV, in many circumstances, a main-effects analysis 
involving multiple sets of counterfactuals may be logical and appropriate. 
Second, it is necessary to distinguish a finding of factual causation from a 
finding of liability. I do not argue that all factors—even all illegitimate or 
unlawful factors—in multiple-sufficient-cause situations should necessarily 
give rise to liability, even when they are appropriately understood as causes 
under the potential outcomes framework. In many circumstances, courts may 
appropriately preclude liability based on other legal or policy grounds. 
The counterfactual model of causation should not be understood as a 
narrow test to be applied rigidly to all claims equally regardless of the details 
of a claim. It is a general framework for asking and answering questions 
concerning cause and effect. When applied with due nuance to claims 
involving multiple sufficient causes, the counterfactual model of causation 
produces results that are consistent with intuition and sound policy, and it 
permits standards that yield more effective and predictable law. 
 
